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Abstract 
 
This thesis comprises of three essays intended to enhance our understanding of socio-
economic implications of terrorism and armed conflict. Chapter 1 applies time series 
methods to establish whether income-based transference of international terrorism took 
place in reaction to the selected historical events. The analysis shows that the rise of 
fundamentalist terrorism in 1979 brought increases across all countries, while the post-Cold 
War era reduced incidents in all but the poorest countries. The September 11 attacks had no 
long lasting impact on the distribution of terrorism, while the Iraq war seemed to have 
reduced terrorism in rich states. Chapter 2 investigates the fatality sensitivity of public 
opinion in coalition countries that participate in war efforts but are not a leading force. The 
analysis is based on the opinion polls from the United Kingdom, Poland and Australia. The 
study recognizes the dynamic nature of the analyzed relationship and employs the error 
correction model. Overall, the data does not provide a clear evidence of sensitivity to 
soldier casualties. However, the public appears sensitive to the intensity of terrorism in 
Iraq. The results also show that news of success has a power to reduce war opposition, 
while scandals are costly in terms of public support. Chapter 3 explores the impact of 
armed conflict and terrorism on allocation of foreign aid. The study employs two-way panel 
data estimation on a dataset that includes observations for 161 recipient countries over the 
period from 1973 to 2007. The results show that armed conflict has a strongly negative 
effect on both bilateral and multilateral assistance, while the impact of terrorism is 
somewhat mixed. Namely, international terrorism tends to increase bilateral aid, while 
domestic terrorism reduces multilateral aid. 
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Introduction 
 
Terrorism and armed conflict, whether internal or external, are forms of violence that affect 
human lives on many levels. They may force individuals to alter their behaviour in search 
of safety. They may energize, unite in struggle or divide entire societies. They may move 
groups of people or nations that are not directly affected by the violence but nonetheless 
wishing to help, either by pressurizing their governments to react, or by contributing to 
humanitarian ventures. Also businesses are likely to be forced to change their ways of 
conduct when their insurance premiums increase or supply chains and markets become 
disrupted. Finally, governments, or multilateral organizations, may be involved in conflict 
or attacked by terrorists. In this case they may have to adjust their policies and shift 
resources appropriately. Even authorities that have not been directly affected may be 
expected to take some steps. Obviously, such a wide array of potential effects could not 
have skipped the attention of researchers in various disciplines, including economics.  
Attributes of Terrorism and Conflict 
Before proceeding to a brief review of economic aspects of terrorism and armed conflict, 
this introduction will discuss the nature of the two phenomena. The definition of terrorism 
used in this thesis is adopted from Enders and Sandler (2006), who see terrorism as: 
―the premeditated use or threat of use of violence by individuals or subnational 
groups to obtain a political or social objective through intimidation of a large 
audience beyond that of the immediate victims‖. 
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Thus, an act of terrorism requires interaction of three parts: perpetrators, victims and 
audience. Typically, the datasets used in the subsequent chapters see a victim as a non-
combatant target and exclude assaults on members of occupying armies, but include attacks 
against peacekeeping forces. The definition leaves out state terror, where a government 
employs violence to achieve its goals, but admits state-sponsored terrorism, where a 
government provides assistance to a terrorist group. Finally, an act of terrorism needs to 
reach its audience and therefore is designed to attract maximum publicity. This way 
terrorists induce fear within or even beyond the attacked society (see Chapters 1 and 2).  
Depending on national identity of the involved elements, terrorism can be divided 
into two variants: domestic and international. The former requires the perpetrators, victims, 
audience, as well as financial and logistical support to come only from the host country. 
Consequently, the repercussions of a domestic attack do not go beyond the borders of this 
country. If any of these conditions is not met, then an attack is considered to be 
international (Sandler, Arce et al. 2008). For example, the 1995 bombing in Oklahoma City 
was an act of domestic terrorism, because the perpetrator, victims and audience were all 
U.S. citizens (LaFree and Dugan 2008). In contrast, the bombing of the Islamabad Marriott 
Hotel on 20 September 2008 is an example of international terrorism, since the blast killed 
foreigners, including a Czech ambassador (Hussain 2008). As argued in Chapter 1, the 
distinction between a domestic and international incident may become blurred. This is 
because in the increasingly interconnected world, individuals and nations may define their 
interests in a global context. In addition, there is a risk that a domestic incident may turn 
into international if a foreigner becomes an unintentional casualty. However, such accidents 
are rare and randomness of victims should not be a concern (Enders and Sandler 2002). 
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 The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) describes conflict as (Gleditsch, 
Wallensteen et al. 2002):  
“a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the 
use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a 
state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths”. 
Similarly to terrorism, conflicts may be divided into different types, depending on the 
origin or nationality of concerned parties. Thus, when violence is confined within one 
country’s borders, conflict is internal and typically involves domestic opposition fighting 
against the home government. Occasionally, when there is intervention from other states, 
such a conflict may become internationalized internal. In contrast, an external, or interstate, 
armed conflict occurs between two or more states.  
 Conflicts have accompanied us since the beginning of the human kind and 
unquestionably have contributed to shaping the world we know today. In fact, they keep 
actively doing so. In 2001 more than 12 per cent of countries were in a state of war (Collier, 
Elliott et al. 2003). Over the last half a century, a third of all nations were affected by civil 
wars, many of them lasting ten years or more (Blattman and Miguel 2009). Terrorism, 
which is a less intensive form of violence, also has been around for centuries (Sandler, Arce 
et al. 2008), but it was the September 11 attacks, henceforth 9/11, and the ensuing War on 
Terror that boosted public and researchers’ interest in this form of violence. The attacks 
demonstrated how a complicated, unpredictable and dangerous problem the world is facing. 
It made people realize that a terrorist incident can result in a large scale damage to both 
human and physical capital (Becker and Murphy 2001; OECD 2002). By exposing the 
vulnerability to terrorism of the most advanced global power, 9/11 seemed to have made 
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the need to understand patterns governing wars and terrorism more pressing in the eyes of 
the Western world. This has resulted in an increased research, whose trends and main 
findings are summarized in the following section. 
On Terrorism and Conflict Research in Economics 
The economic research on conflict and terrorism focuses on the four main aspects: (1) 
causes, (2) consequences, (3) prevention and resolution, and (4) governing patterns. The 
first branch pays considerable attention to factors such as poverty and economic 
deprivation. The findings indicate that armed conflicts are more likely to occur in poor 
countries with weak governments (Miguel, Satyanath et al. 2004; Elbadawi and Hegre 
2007; Collier and Rohner 2008; Blattman and Miguel 2009). Consequently, the prevalence 
of conflict is particularly high in the developing countries of Africa and Asia (Collier, 
Elliott et al. 2003). Similarly, the incidence of terrorism is likely to depend on the country’s 
development level. However, it is argued that this relationship runs in the opposite 
direction. A micro-level study by Krueger and Maleckova (2003) shows that individual’s 
education and economic status are positively correlated with participation in terrorist 
activities. Furthermore, democracy and openness make terrorism more difficult to control 
and therefore more likely to occur (Hamilton and Hamilton 1983; Mirza and Verdier 2008). 
This could help to explain why the rich democracies of Western Europe and the United 
States experience high frequency of terrorist incidents (Blomberg, Hess et al. 2004; Clauset 
and Young 2005; Mickolus, Sandler et al. 2008).  
 The studies on economic consequences of violence emphasize the role of increased 
uncertainty, which affects consumer behaviour, raises risks and costs of doing business, 
reduces investment and may lead to a capital flight (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003; 2008; 
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Drakos 2004; Eckstein and Tsiddon 2004; Nitsch and Schumacher 2004). A direct 
consequence is destruction of human and physical capital, which together with increased 
government expenditure on security may effectively depress economic growth (Collier, 
Elliott et al. 2003; Gupta, Clements et al. 2004). From the global perspective, the economic 
impact of terrorism on growth is limited and much smaller than that of armed conflict 
(Blomberg, Hess et al. 2004; Gaibulloev and Sandler 2008; 2009). Nonetheless, the effects 
may be severe for specific industries (Drakos 2004), or countries, which experience long-
lasting terrorist campaigns, e.g. the Basque Country and Israel (Abadie and Gardeazabal 
2003; Eckstein and Tsiddon 2004). Typically, large and diversified economies find it easier 
to put up with terrorism because economic activities can shift to less risky sectors. 
Moreover, rich states can afford monetary and fiscal tools to reduce the impact (Gaibulloev 
and Sandler 2008; Sandler, Arce et al. 2008). Thus, although development does not 
guarantee protection from political violence, it can help to mitigate its effects. 
 Finally, the last two branches focus on analyzing prevention and resolution 
methods, as well as patterns governing conflicts. The literature cited above underlines the 
importance of the promotion of economic and social development as a way to prevent 
conflict. Numerous studies analyze specific tools such as foreign aid (see Chapter 3, 
Mandler and Spagat 2003; Azam and Thelen 2008; Bandyopadhyay, Sandler et al. 2010), 
and third-party interventions (e.g. Regan 1996; Elbadawi 2000; Amegashie 2010). Cost-
benefit comparisons are conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of prevention techniques 
and determine the optimal amount of resources that a government should dedicate to 
security (Enders and Sandler 1993; Crain and Crain 2006). The research on conflict and 
terrorism is complemented with studies of statistical patterns of events and casualty 
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accumulation (O'Loughlin 1986; Johnson, Spagat et al. 2006; Bohorquez, Gourley et al. 
2009).  
 Although the research output has considerably expanded in the last two decades, 
there are still many aspects that have not received enough scrutiny. The importance of 
continuous research is reinforced by the constantly changing nature of conflict and 
terrorism. For instance, new communication technologies have led to an evolution of new 
models of organizations. Terrorists have developed new ways of financing their operations 
and become able to launch global campaigns (Jenkins 2006). At the same time they have 
managed to increase the destructive power and lethality of their attacks (Hoffman 1999; 
Clauset and Young 2005). The following section contains a thesis outline and identifies 
some of the gaps in current knowledge that this thesis intends to fill. 
Thesis Outline 
The thesis comprises of three essays, each offering a study of economic and political 
aspects of terrorism and/or armed conflict. Relevant tables and figures are presented at the 
end of each chapter.  
Chapter 1 applies time series analysis to establish whether income-based 
transference of international terrorism took place in reaction to four shifts in global politics 
and terrorism. It offers several extensions over existent work, for instance it uses two 
independent datasets and presents an alternative approach to the Iraq war. It shows that the 
rise of fundamentalist terrorism in 1979 brought an increase in the number of attacks across 
all countries, while the end of the Cold War resulted in a reduction in terrorism in high and 
medium income countries. 9/11 appeared to have had no long lasting impact on distribution 
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of terrorism, while the 2003 Iraq invasion seemed to have reduced international terrorism in 
rich states.  
The findings of Chapter 2 may be of a particular interest to governments 
considering military endeavours abroad. It studies fatality sensitivity of public opinion in 
coalition countries, i.e. those that participate in war efforts but are not a leading military 
force. The opinion polls from the United Kingdom, Poland and Australia do not provide 
conclusive evidence on the sensitivity to soldier casualties. However, they support a claim 
that the public is sensitive to the intensity of terrorism in the occupied country. The results 
also show that news of success, such as the end of the invasion and the capture of Saddam 
Hussein, have a power to significantly reduce war opposition, while scandals, such as the 
torture at Abu Ghraib, appear to be very costly in terms of public support. 
 Chapter 3 studies the impact of armed conflict and terrorism on allocation of foreign 
aid. Although political violence may constitute a hindrance for development and disturb 
interests of foreign donors, aid may serve as a reimbursement for making counter-terrorist 
efforts that benefit the donor country. The empirical strategy is based on the two-way panel 
data estimation on a dataset comprising of observations for 161 recipient countries over the 
period of 35 years. The results indicate that armed conflict has a large and negative effect 
on both multilateral and bilateral aid. However, bilateral donors seem to turn a blind eye on 
violence in oil exporting countries. Although international terrorism tends to increase 
bilateral aid, bilateral donors are not sensitive to domestic terrorism and tend to penalize the 
poorest countries affected by this form of violence. At the same time, multilateral aid does 
not react to international terrorism, but reacts to its domestic variant. 
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Chapter 1 
Impact of Selected Historical Events on the Income-Based Distribution of 
Terrorism
1
 
From the Rise of Fundamentalist Terrorism to the Iraq War 
 
1.1. Introduction 
This chapter seeks to answer whether four major historical events induced changes in the 
distribution of international terrorism among countries by income class. It also explores the 
effects of discrepancies between two terrorism datasets – MIPT and ITERATE – on the 
obtained results. I start by attempting to replicate the work of Enders and Sandler (2006) 
and find that although some of their results hold up, their unclear income classification 
prevents me from reproducing many of their estimates. Similarly to the two authors, I 
divide countries into three categories: high-, medium- and low-income countries (HICs, 
MICs and LICs, respectively), and apply time series analysis to evaluate whether terrorists 
have altered their target locations categorized by countries’ income in response to the rise 
of religious fundamentalism, the end of the Cold War and the September 11 attacks, 
henceforth 9/11. Subsequently, I move beyond the replication exercise and introduce 
several extensions, which can be seen as an advance over the existent work. First, I analyze 
the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Database (2008) in addition to the ITERATE dataset used 
by Enders and Sandler (2006). Second, I follow the World Bank’s income classification 
                                                 
1
 This chapter has been published in the September 2011(55) issue of the International Studies Quarterly.  
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more closely. Third, I offer more efficient analysis in cases where there are few events. 
Fourth, I scrutinize the effects of the 2003 Iraq invasion and its aftermath. Finally, I suggest 
an expanded analysis of the recent Iraqi conflict by incorporating domestic events under the 
presumption that they have an international audience and affect foreign interests. 
I base my considerations on the assumption that terrorists act rationally and adapt to 
changes in constraints (see Atkinson, Sandler et al. 1987; Anderton and Carter 2005). As 
Enders and Sandler (2006) show, this implies that terrorists choose venues that promise a 
higher ratio of expected benefits to expected costs. This framework allows for a substitution 
between targets. For instance, in a situation when one state manages to raise the cost of 
terrorism relative to other countries, assuming unchanged expected benefits, one may 
expect a shift of attacks away from the more costly place. Such a process is income-based if 
changes are dependent on the wealth of the considered nations. A good example here are 
security upgrades – wealthy nations can afford more effective measures than their poorer 
counterparts. Thus, in periods of increased threat, when countries tend to boost their 
security, we may observe transference of terrorism to less developed states that are unable 
to afford widespread counterterrorism measures
2
.  
I analyze four major historical developments which may have affected the 
distribution patterns of international terrorism among countries. The first three events are 
discussed by Enders and Sandler (2006) and include: (i) the emergence of fundamentalist-
based terrorism in the last quarter of 1979, (ii) the end of the Cold War in the end of 1991, 
and (iii) the September 11 attacks in 2001. Additionally, the developments after the 2003 
                                                 
2
 Tighter security measures may not work if they increase expected benefits to terrorists, for example 
through raising a perceived value of a target or causing new grievances. In this case, terrorists may carry out 
even more attacks. 
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invasion of Iraq give rise to a fourth breaking point, which is not accounted for in Enders 
and Sandler (2006). The war has intensified the grievances of the Muslim world against the 
United States and increased opportunities for terrorists to target foreigners arriving in Iraq. 
It also inflicted the feeling of humiliation, which was further inflamed by the events in Abu 
Ghraib and the Guantanamo Bay. Overall, the number of all international incidents globally 
grew from 814 during 18 quarters before the war to 1,311 in the analogous period after the 
invasion (MIPT). Remarkably, Iraq was a stage to 45 per cent of all international attacks 
between May 2003 and December 2007 (MIPT). A brief description of the events 
associated with the four breaking points and their potential importance is offered in the 
appendix at the end of this chapter. 
In spite of applying a framework similar to that in Enders and Sandler (2006), I 
obtain somewhat different results.  I find that the rise of fundamentalism in 1979 increased 
terrorism across all income groups and as such its effect was income insensitive, while 
Enders and Sandler (2006) ascribe it entirely to LICs. The end of the Cold War coincided 
with transference of terrorism to LICs, which is in contrary to Enders and Sandler’s (2006) 
finding of a significant decline across all income groups. In spite of the heightened 
frequency with which terrorism has appeared in news services since 2001, there is no 
evidence of a permanent increase in the number of incidents following 9/11. However, I 
find immediate transference of all casualty and U.S. casualty incidents to rich countries. 
The Iraq war seemed to have reduced terrorism in rich countries and it did not increase the 
vulnerability of U.S. interests outside Iraq. When I look at the wider range of Iraq incidents, 
the data suggests transference of terrorism from HICs to this Middle Eastern country. 
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The reminder of this chapter is organized as follows. Sections 1.2 and 1.3 present 
the data sources and descriptive statistics. Sections 1.4 and 1.5 briefly describe the 
theoretical model as well as present estimation results. Section 1.6 suggests an alternative 
approach to terrorism in Iraq. Finally, Section 1.7 offers concluding remarks. 
1.2. Data 
In order to study the distribution of international terrorism across countries by income class, 
one needs two sorts of data: records listing actual incidents, and information on income in 
each state at respective time. The latter is published annually in the World Development 
Reports
3
 (World Bank 1978-2008). Based on their gross national income (GNI) per capita, 
states are divided into three income categories: low, medium and high income countries – 
LICs, MICs and HICs, respectively
4
. Using income classes as proxies of countries’ 
development levels circumvents, at least partially, the problem of reporting bias and lower 
reliability of data that could surface in some cases, typically for the poorest states or those 
with autocratic regimes. Importantly, I follow the income taxonomy more strictly than 
Enders and Sandler (2006), whose interpretation of the World Bank’s classification is 
somewhat confusing. The World Bank distinguishes two subgroups of MICs – Lower 
Middle Income and Upper Middle Income Countries. From the example given by Enders 
and Sandler (2006:372-373), one concludes that they treat the two sub-groups as one class. 
But they also say that Mexico moved from LICs to MICs, while Poland shifted in the 
opposite direction. In fact none of these countries was ever classified as LIC and the only 
                                                 
3
 I use data for every year, while Enders and Sandler (2006) base their considerations only on five 
volumes: 1978, 1980, 1990, 1995 and 2000. 
4
 In 2006 LICs had GNI per capita of $905 or less, MICs between $906 and $11,115, while HICs of 
$11,116 or more. As economies’ growth rates change over time, countries happen to switch between classes. 
Last two decades have brought an increase in the number of HICs and a decrease in the number of LICs. 
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moves they made were between lower and upper middle income classes, thus, staying 
within the MIC group all the time. 
The data on international terrorist attacks is drawn from two independent sources: 
the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base
5
, which was managed by the Oklahoma City 
National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT 2008), and the 
International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE), which has been 
developed by Mickolus, Sandler et al. (2008). Both sources define terrorism as violence for 
political purposes by sub-national actors, designed to induce an atmosphere of fear and 
anxiety, and as a result influence behaviour of an audience beyond that of the immediate 
victims (see MIPT 2002; Mickolus, Sandler et al. 2008). Importantly, both datasets draw 
from open sources, such as news services, and concentrate on actions against non-
combatant targets. Since this study focuses on international events, which include 
perpetrators, targets, victims or interests from more than one country, it dismisses any 
domestic attacks that are recorded in MIPT (an exception is Section 1.6). Overall, MIPT 
records 10,237 international incidents between 1 January 1968 and 31 December 2007, 
while ITERATE reports 12,975 events over the same period. This difference is partially 
caused by the fact that MIPT dismisses any hoaxes, foiled plots or bombs that detonate as a 
perpetrator is building them (MIPT 2002), while ITERATE is more inclusive and 
incorporates a wider range of events including hoaxes, and those aborted by terrorists or 
authorities at any stage of planning or execution (Mickolus, Sandler et al. 2008). When we 
                                                 
5
 The MIPT dataset consists of two sub-sets: the RAND Terrorism Chronology which covers years from 
1968 to 1997 and the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database that records incidents from 1998 to 2007. 
The Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB) ceased its operations on 31 March 2008. The RAND Corporation still 
keeps on collecting new data, but this is no longer available through the MIPT’s website. The TKB’s dataset 
with information on terrorist groups can be accessed through START at 
http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data/tops/. 
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look only at ITERATE’s executed attacks, then the number decreases to 10,312 which is 
very similar to MIPT’s count. Unfortunately, the data is not complete with some 
observations missing. For example, ITERATE records no location of 47 incidents, which 
consequently are excluded from the further analysis. Moreover, it does not state a month of 
incident for 108 observations, which makes it impossible to establish to which quarter an 
accident belongs. This problem is particularly noticeable for year 1999 when nearly 25 per 
cent of all attacks have no specified month. Since deleting these observations would greatly 
affect the time series, I allocate one-fourth of them to each quarter of the year. MIPT in turn 
is not free from errors of geographical misallocation, for instance several attacks were 
mistakenly assigned to the German Democratic Republic while they took place in West 
Germany.  
Using the described datasets, I aggregate the observations over three-month periods. 
Working on quarterly data minimizes the risk of having intervals with zero or near-zero 
observations, which would violate the normality assumptions underlying the inferential 
procedures used in this chapter. Similarly to Enders and Sandler (2006), I generate four 
time series. First, “all incidents” includes quarterly totals for all types of international 
attacks. Second, the “casualty” series lists only attacks with either a death and/or injury. 
The next two series are subsets of the first two and contain only incidents against U.S. 
targets. These allow me to examine whether the efforts to improve homeland security in the 
United States after 9/11 resulted in transference of incidents against U.S. interests to other 
countries.  
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1.3. Descriptive statistics 
This section discusses patterns in transnational terrorism through a descriptive statistics 
analysis and highlights some discrepancies between the two terrorism databases. Figure 1.1 
depicts numbers of terrorist events per quarter and by income class between 1968 and 2007. 
In each panel the vertical axes measure the quarterly totals while the time scale is marked 
on the horizontal axes. The plots in the bottom of each panel present differences between 
the two datasets computed by deducting the MIPT counts from the ITERATE totals. All 
panels of Figure 1.1 give the impression of an increase in terrorist activity with the advent 
of fundamentalist violence. The end of the Cold War seems to be associated with a 
noticeable decline in the number of incidents in Panels 1, 3 and 4. However, LICs suffer 
from a further escalation of terrorism and their number of attacks doubles. The post-9/11 
period seems to bring immediate increases across all series. Subsequently, the Iraq invasion 
is likely to benefit particularly HICs, where the average quarterly number of incidents drops 
by two-thirds. At the same time, Panel 3 suggests a drastic expansion of terrorism in the 
MIC group which includes Iraq. The difference plots in the bottom of each panel show that 
the ITERATE totals are typically higher until the mid-1990s, when the two series become 
fairly similar. Once again, its counts are higher in 1998 and 1999, when MIPT was not 
collecting data and its records were completed a number of years later (Sandler and Enders 
2008). Discrepancies in recent years, when the MIPT totals exceed those of ITERATE, can 
be largely contributed to the way the databases handle attacks in Israel, Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Table 1.1 shows that MIPT totals are on average 2.5 times higher than those 
reported by ITERATE. The MIPT’s record of 351 attacks in rich countries is largely 
influenced by events in Israel that constitute 62 per cent of all HIC incidents. In contrast, 
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ITERATE lists only 33 attacks that took place in Israel during this period
6
. MIPT also 
seems to be more efficient when reporting incidents in Iraq. It lists nearly three times more 
international attacks than the rival dataset. When I match the ITERATE’s records of all 
attacks that took place in Iraq in 2005 with the MIPT’s content, I find that only nine 
incidents shown in ITERATE are not included in MIPT. At the same time ITERATE omits 
tens of incidents which are undoubtedly international and shown in MIPT
7
. This may imply 
either a violation of ITERATE’s classification rule or inadequate resources to deal with the 
overwhelming rise of terrorism in the Middle Eastern country.  
 Quarterly totals for events with casualties and attacks against U.S. citizens and/or 
property are displayed in Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3, respectively. Notably, casualty 
incidents seem to affect mostly MICs, which contradicts Enders and Sandler’s (2006) 
finding that mainly LICs suffer from this type of attacks. Figure 1.3 indicates that U.S. 
citizens and property appeared to benefit largely from the end of the Cold War as the 
average number of attacks against them decreased from 22 to 11 per quarter (MIPT). 
Although this is true for the MIC and HIC groups, the changes in LICs follow an opposite 
direction and again contradict the suggestion of Enders and Sandler (2006).  
                                                 
6
 Undoubtedly, Israel was a stage to more than 33 terrorist incidents reported by ITERATE over the 
seven years period, which also included the Second Intifada. I assume that a large portion of those events was 
treated as domestic and consequently not included in ITERATE. However, since the dataset perceives 
Palestine and Israel as two separate states, it should include those attacks, as MIPT does.  
7
 A common perception is that a large portion of attacks in Iraq is aimed at military targets. Nonetheless, 
MIPT and ITERATE list, respectively, only one and 26 such incidents after the beginning of the invasion. 
Examples of attacks included in MIPT but omitted by ITERATE are:  a kidnapping of a Japanese engineer on 
19 January 2005 in Baiji, a kidnapping of U.S. firm’s employees in Kirkuk on 9 March 2005, a shooting of 
foreign contractors (Australian, American and Canadian) on 21 April 2005. 
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Although the descriptive statistics analysis gives some useful insights to the 
problem of distribution of terrorism among countries, it is only an introduction to the 
formal inferential analysis conducted in the following sections. 
1.4. Estimation method 
All of the terrorist series recorded numerous increases and declines throughout the entire 
sample period. To answer the question of the significance of these changes, I employ an 
autoregressive process of order p, AR(p), augmented by adding five intervention variables
8
: 
                                         
 
   
          
   (1.1) 
 where yt is the number of attacks of a particular type in period t, a0 is a constant and εt is an 
error term. The intervention variables represent the historical events and take the following 
values: 
- rise of fundamentalist-based terrorism:  FUND = 1 for t ≥ 1979:4 and 0 otherwise, 
- the end of the Cold War:    POST = 1 for t ≥ 1992:1 and 0 otherwise, 
- 9/11 (permanent effect):    SEPT = 1 for t ≥ 2001:3 and 0 otherwise, 
- 9/11 (pulse dummy):   DP =1 if t = 2001:3 and 0 otherwise, 
- the Iraq war:     IRAQ = 1 for t ≥ 2003:3 and 0 otherwise. 
There are two variables associated with the effects of 9/11: SEPT allows for a long lasting 
change in the incident series, while DP tests for a temporary effect, which would 
                                                 
8
 This is a modified form of the model introduced by Enders and Sandler (2006). 
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materialize if 9/11 was only an isolated incident. The order p of the AR process for each 
time series is determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC).  
Although the ordinary least squares (OLS) method gives estimates whose 
interpretation is intuitive, such models do not guarantee the best fit for count data. The 
issue becomes particularly visible for “thin” series (with a number of observations near the 
lower zero bound), where OLS estimates, although consistent, may result in a biased 
inference. To circumvent this problem, I obtain maximum likelihood estimates based on the 
negative binomial (NB) distribution. I model its conditional mean as:  
                     
                              
 
   
        
(1.2) 
where     
  is a strictly positive transformation of yt-i, such as     
  equals yt-i if yt-i > 0 and  c 
if yt-i = 0. The parameter c is obtained using a grid search over the interval 0.01 ≤ c ≤ 0.99
9
.  
The NB model also offers an improvement over the Poisson model used by Enders 
and Sandler (2006). The Poisson distribution assumes equality between the mean and 
variance which is not the case for the terrorism time series. Although such a model can give 
consistent coefficients, its standard errors are likely to be downward biased, resulting in 
spuriously large z-values (Long 1997). The NB model overcomes this limitation by 
allowing for a larger dispersion and outperforms the Poisson process for all the terrorist 
                                                 
9
 See Cameron and Trivedi (1998) for more details on the NB model specification. 
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time series. The estimation results are presented in the following section. For the reasons 
mentioned above, I report NB estimates when a time series contains numerous zero values. 
1.5.  Results 
Regression results are presented in Figure 1.4 and Figure 1.5. Each bar represents a 95 per 
cent confidence interval (CI) for an estimate, which is marked with a horizontal line. The 
Ljung – Box Q test indicates that residuals are white noise in all regressions. Showing CIs 
enables a visual inspection of the degree of similarity or divergence between the estimates 
based on the two datasets and those obtained by Enders and Sandler (2006). I also mark 
cases of non-overlapping pairs of CIs or where coefficients have opposing signs. In 
addition, Table 1.2 facilitates discussion by summarizing the effects found by Enders and 
Sandler (2006) and stating whether my results confirm (“yes”) or contradict (“no”) their 
findings. Cases where Enders and Sandler (2006) report significant effects, but my 
estimates are not statistically different from zero are coded as “maybe”. In such situations, I 
cannot reject their results completely because the discrepancy may be caused by the fact 
that the datasets I use overlook some incidents. Such a modest approach is likely to 
understate my findings as in many cases “maybes” could have been coded as “no’s”. This is 
most evident with ITERATE, which is also used by Enders and Sandler (2006); here the 
differences are caused purely by the more careful application of the World Bank’s income 
classification in this chapter. The instances where I obtain the same effect with both MIPT 
and ITERATE, but it is different from that in Enders and Sandler (2006) are marked in 
bold. As already mentioned, whenever a time series contains a large number of zeros, I base 
the inference on more efficient NB estimates. A full set of OLS and NB estimates as well as 
the information on the number of quarters with zero attacks in each series can be found in 
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Table 1.4 to Table 1.7. Importantly, both methods of estimation give similar results with 
consistent signs
10
.  
The first of the historical developments, the advent of the religious fundamentalism 
(FUND), raised the overall level of terrorism by around 20 attacks per quarter, but it 
seemed to affect neither the casualty incidents nor the attacks against U.S. interests. This is 
in line with the findings of Enders and Sandler (2006).  However, I do not find any 
evidence to support their claim of the decline in all incidents in MICs, and transference of 
terrorism from this group to LICs. In contrary, I show that the effect of fundamentalist 
terrorism spreads across all income groups (ITERATE’s coefficient for HICs is positive 
and significant at 10 per cent confidence level). Furthermore, ITERATE does not show any 
significant results for the casualty incidents or attacks against U.S. targets, while MIPT 
returns increases in these series only for HICs. The significant autoregressive coefficients 
included in Table 1.4 to Table 1.7 confirm the intertemporal correlation of the terrorist 
series. They also enable me to compute the long run effects of the rise of the fundamentalist 
terrorism. For instance, the steady-state value of all attacks worldwide increased by 34.94 
[=22.01/(1-0.37)] incidents per quarter according to MIPT, and 32.04 [=17.62/(1-0.17-0.14-
0.14)] according to ITERATE. This increase appeared to be equally large among MICs 
(15.02 for MIPT, 16.4 for ITERATE) and HICs (15.47 for MIPT, 12.53 for ITERATE).  
The estimates of the effect of the end of the Cold War (POST) on global terrorism 
series confirm Enders and Sandler’s (2006) finding of the decline in incidents of all types 
and casualty incidents against U.S. targets. At the same time, there was no impact on the 
                                                 
10
 The only exception seems to be the ITERATE estimates for all types of attacks in MICs, where the 
coefficients on FUND and SEPT are significant in the OLS model but insignificant in the NB model.  
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remaining incident types. The long run effects appear to be much stronger for ITERATE, 
with an overall drop of 53.96 incidents, compared to MIPT’s 32.35 attacks per quarter. The 
same pattern is observed for the remaining time series. On the income group level, my 
results back the drops across the MIC and HIC samples. Nonetheless, I reject the claim of 
reduced number of attacks in LICs. In fact, I find evidence of transference of terrorism 
from MICs and/or HICs to the poorest countries for all of the series (MIPT does not 
support this only for the casualty incidents). This effect can perhaps be attributed to the fact 
that both sides of the Iron Curtain lost their interest in destabilizing each other, and 
therefore, the support for terrorists was reduced. This was accompanied by the emergence 
of new LICs
11
 and diminished efforts to maintain the Soviet or Western influence in 
peripheral countries, which deprived of resources and assistance in the field of security 
became unable to control internal tensions and ethnic hatreds. It is also likely that the 
atmosphere of global changes might have been exploited by insurgents in underdeveloped 
states who demanded reforms also in their countries.  
 My estimates do not show permanent changes in the distribution of terrorism 
following the events of 9/11 (SEPT). However, the two datasets do not agree on the effects 
on incidents of all types for MICs and HICs. The rise of terrorism in HICs shown by MIPT 
is attributed to the dataset’s much higher number of incidents in Israel. It should not be 
generalized for the entire HIC sample as the regression does not return any change when 
attacks in Israel are excluded (not shown). Notably, I do not find evidence to support the 
rise of terrorism targeted at the U.S. interests, which is claimed by Enders and Sandler 
(2006).  
                                                 
11
 According to the World Development Reports there were 49 LICs in 1989, 59 in 1993 and 63 in 2000. 
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 The picture gets more complicated when it comes to the immediate effect of 9/11 
(Dp). My ITERATE estimates validate most of the results of Enders and Sandler (2006). 
Overall, I confirm their result of transference of casualty incidents from LICs to HICs, but 
unlike them, I also find a decline in MICs. An analogous transference appeared in the series 
representing casualty incidents with a U.S. target, which is also confirmed by the MIPT 
estimates. The rise in terrorism in rich countries could be attributed to the increase of 
perceived marginal benefits, as well as an ease of causing anxiety immediately after 9/11, 
which in turn decreased the marginal cost of terrorism. In the long run, however, security 
upgrades in rich countries seem to have managed to raise the marginal cost enough to deter 
terrorist activity. 
 The war in Iraq is not taken into account by Enders and Sandler (2006), and 
therefore its effect is not shown in Table 1.2. The relevant estimates are displayed in Figure 
1.4 and Figure 1.5. The invasion and its aftermath did not seem to have any noticeable 
impact on the global, LIC and MIC series. This outcome is somewhat unexpected taking 
into account the heightened number of events in Iraq, which is classified as a medium 
income country. Furthermore, negative coefficients for the incidents against U.S. targets 
suggest that the war did not increase the vulnerability of the U.S. interests. The MIPT 
estimates reveal a considerable decline of 16.67 and 6.48 attacks per quarter in the numbers 
of all incidents and casualty incidents in HICs, respectively. These are associated with the 
long run declines of 23.15 and 12.46 events, respectively. ITERATE returns a similar result 
for the all incident series. This suggests that the increased presence of the Western forces in 
terrorists’ homelands could have engaged them enough to keep them away from launching 
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attacks in rich countries. It may also suggest that further advance in security measures in 
HICs have paid off. 
This section demonstrates that MIPT and ITERATE give fairly similar results, with 
the largest discrepancies concentrated in the immediate effect of 9/11. The reason behind 
this lies mostly in the databases’ different handling of incidents in recent years. The 
comparison of the ITERATE estimates presented in this chapter with those of Enders and 
Sandler (2006) shows comparable coefficients for HICs and the worldwide series. The 
considerable differences in estimates for MICs and LICs are an outcome of discrepancies 
between the used income classifications, which have been addressed earlier. 
1.6.  Iraq – an alternative approach 
This section looks closer at terrorism in Iraq after the 2003 invasion. I argue that attacks in 
which only Iraqi nationals are directly involved are “weakly” international because they are 
likely to affect audiences beyond the host country. Since terrorist incidents in Iraq occupy 
international news nearly every day, the Western public opinion must be somewhat 
influenced by those events (Livingston 1997; Aday 2010; Lee 2011; Chapter 2). By 
spreading violence terrorists try to convince the citizenry of the coalition countries that the 
war cannot be won, and therefore the international forces should be withdrawn. This 
message is expected to reduce public support for the war (see Chapter 2), which is crucial 
for democratic governments to carry out their operations, particularly foreign military 
missions, which may be perceived as unnecessary loss of resources and lives. In addition, 
prolonged instability is associated with greater human costs paid by the coalition armies, 
larger expenditures for the coalition states’ budgets, and prevents their businesses from 
reaping expected benefits (Krepinevich 2005; Bilmes and Stiglitz 2006). Furthermore, 
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unpopularity of operations in Iraq may reduce general support for some governments and as 
such hinder internal reforms (Gelpi, Feaver et al. 2006; Klarevas, Gelpi et al. 2006). The 
developments in Iraq also influence the perception of the West, particularly the United 
States, among the Middle Eastern and Muslim nations (Pew Global Attitudes Project 2005; 
Zogby 2007). Although the analysis and arguments presented in this section may 
overestimate the number of international terrorist attacks in Iraq, taking into account only 
those incidents that MIPT or ITERATE classify as international underestimates the 
problem. Ultimately, the real impact of the Iraq war on international terrorism is likely to 
lie somewhere between these two extremes, and the results presented here should be read 
with caution.  
Based on the above arguments, I extend the terrorism series by taking the MIPT 
dataset
12
 with only international events and adding 9,063 attacks that took place in Iraq 
after 1 May 2003 and did not involve foreign targets directly. The time series obtained 
through this exercise are plotted in Figure 1.6. Since the violence generating process in Iraq 
is unique and different from other countries, I separate Iraq from the MIC group and 
display events recorded only in this country in Panel 2. All other MIC incidents (without 
Iraq) are shown in Panel 4. As expected, there seems to be a dramatic rise of terrorism in 
Iraq following the 2003 invasion, which is also reflected in the worldwide totals. Notably, 
the MIC series that exclude incidents in Iraq seems to be unaffected by the invasion and its 
aftermath. 
                                                 
12
 This section uses only the MIPT database which, unlike ITERATE, provides also information about 
domestic terrorist incidents (since 1998).  
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 The formal analysis relies on testing for structural breaks in time series at unknown 
date τm. As before, I use an AR(p) process, and estimate the following model: 
                
 
   
                      
 
   
                (1.3) 
where yt is the number of incidents in period t, a10 and a20 are constants and εt is an error 
term. The indicator function, I(.), takes the value of zero before the tested break date, τm, 
and I(.) = 1 otherwise. I follow the procedure described by Bai (1997) to find the unknown 
break points
13
. The expected location of structural changes near to the end of the time series 
forces me to trim the data by 7.5 per cent, and consider break dates in the central 85 per 
cent of the sample.  
Table 1.3 reports the identified break dates along with estimated coefficients based 
on Equation 1.3 for all countries and Iraq. I do not show results for the “MIC without Iraq” 
sample as it does not experience any significant structural changes related to the Iraq war
14
. 
Table 1.3 draws a picture considerably different from that in Figure 1.4 and Figure 1.5. All 
the series experience breaks in the second quarter of 2004. The long-run mean of all 
incidents worldwide rises from 65.9 before the break to 184.5 after. This is largely caused 
by the events in Iraq, where the corresponding measure soars from zero to 149 attacks per 
quarter. A similar development is present in the casualty series, where long-run mean rises 
                                                 
13
 An estimate of a break is the value of τm that minimizes the sum of squared residuals. I employ the 
sup-Wald statistic for which under the null hypothesis of no break, a20 = a21 = ... = a2p = 0 (see Bai 1997). The 
critical values are extrapolated from Andrews (1993). To rule out serial correlation in estimated residuals, I 
perform Ljung-Box Q test. 
14
 I also drop the series representing incidents with U.S. targets as based on the above logic all attacks in 
Iraq after the invasion affect the American audience. 
35 
 
to 96.7 incidents per quarter for Iraq and 115, or nearly four-fold, for all countries
15
. 
Importantly, the remarkable escalation of violence in Iraq combined with the decline of 
attacks in HICs, which is shown in the previous section, suggests a possibility of 
transference of terrorism from the latter to the former.  
The formal analysis shows structural changes in the terrorism series a year after the 
invasion. There may be several explanations for this delay. First, terrorists needed time to 
come up with a strategy, organize resources and people. Second, scandals such as the abuse 
at the Abu Ghraib prison (came to light in April 2004), and Mukaradeeb killings (the U.S. 
forces bombed and killed 42 civilians during a wedding party in May 2004) could have 
further aroused insurgents’ determination to fight the U.S.-controlled regime. Moreover, the 
outrage caused by these events among the Iraqi public could have increased the support for 
the insurgency among some individuals. Third, terrorists started to target the newly forming 
Iraqi police and military, as well as people who wanted to join them
16
 (MIPT 2008). By 
making the Iraqi security forces appear weak and unable to defend themselves, terrorists 
were sending a message that the coalition’s efforts to bring stability to the country were 
failing (Pape 2006). 
1.7.  Concluding remarks 
I apply time series analysis to identify income-based changes in patterns of international 
terrorism in response to the rise of religious fundamentalism, the end of the Cold War, 9/11 
                                                 
15
  Figure 1.6 shows that the number of terrorist events in Iraq seemed to be decreasing in 2006. 
However, it cannot be confirmed in the above analysis as it is unfeasible to find structural breaks at dates so 
near to the end of time series.  
16
 Attacks against the Iraqi police and military, which are not a part of the occupying forces, constitute 
terrorism. However, only 0.6% of all terrorist attacks in Iraq after the invasion were against military targets. 
Analogously, attacks on civilians waiting to volunteer for these services constitute terrorism.  
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and the invasion of Iraq. Since ITERATE and MIPT are likely to undercount international 
incidents in the latter country, I expand the series by adding incidents that took place in Iraq 
after May 2003 and did not involve foreign victims, but presumably affected international 
audiences. The results reported in this paper do not confirm all findings of Enders and 
Sandler (2006), whose paper I am initially trying to replicate. I show that the effect of 
fundamentalist terrorism spreads across all income groups, while the two authors ascribe it 
entirely to LICs. They also find a significant decline across all groups following the end of 
the Cold War, while I reject this claim and find transference of terrorism to LICs. I confirm 
Enders and Sandler’s (2006) finding that 9/11 did not have as large impact on international 
terrorism as the two previous events. The Iraq war, which is not accounted for in Enders 
and Sandler (2006), coincided with a reduction of terrorism in rich countries and did not 
increase the vulnerability of U.S. interests outside Iraq. Additionally, the analysis of the 
wider range of Iraq incidents suggests a possibility of transference of terrorism from HICs 
to this Middle Eastern country. Based on that, one could draw a naive conclusion that it is 
beneficial to invade another country in order to engage terrorists in combat abroad and keep 
them away from the homeland. However, such reasoning does not take into consideration 
costs of military operations in Iraq, which are likely to be much higher than the damage 
inflicted by potential terrorist incidents at home.  
The discrepancies between this paper and Enders and Sandler (2006) lie mainly in 
results for MICs and LICs and are attributable mostly to the fact that I follow the World 
Bank’s income classification in a more strict and consistent way. Furthermore, I suggest 
using negative binomial distribution, which allows for overdispersion in the data, and 
therefore offers more efficient results than the Poisson model used by Enders and Sandler 
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(2006). In addition to the extant work, I explore the effects of discrepancies between MIPT 
and ITERATE on the obtained results, which concentrate mostly in different approaches to 
coding incidents in Afghanistan, Iraq and Israel, as well as the fact that, unlike MIPT, 
ITERATE includes hoaxes and foiled plots in its records. Although the two datasets give 
fairly similar results, I argue that MIPT’s methodology is somewhat more sensible when it 
comes to recording incidents in Iraq and Israel. Overall, this paper exposes the sensitivity of 
findings in Enders and Sandler (2006) and provides a caveat against the dangers of using 
cross-national income data in time series analysis. 
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Appendix: Selected historical events 
The emergence of fundamentalist-based terrorism was marked by the attack on the U.S. 
embassy in Teheran on 4 November 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan launched 
on 25 December 1979. These two events were followed by an increase in the number of 
religious terrorist organizations that are characterized by more dispersed structure than their 
earlier counterparts and employ value systems that allow them to perceive violence as a 
sacramental act (Hoffman 1999).  
The second historical event that could influence the terrorist patterns is the end of 
the Cold War era which coincided with the Gulf War, the capturing of left-wing terrorists 
by Western European states and the enhanced cooperation in combating crime and 
terrorism within the European Union. The collapse of the Soviet dominion meant 
disappearance of some state sponsors and lesser resources available to terrorists. Hence, it 
was likely to decrease the amount of terrorism. Nevertheless, the peace dividend was 
endangered by the call of the Iraqi leader for terrorists to target the nations involved in the 
Gulf War. The breakup of the U.S.S.R. and democratization of Eastern Europe created new 
space for old ethnic hatreds. Furthermore, the Maastricht Treaty opened intra-European 
borders also for terrorists (Enders and Sandler 1999).  
The attacks of 9/11 were characterized by unprecedented death toll, which 
amounted to 2,982 fatalities (World Trade Organization 2006) and equalled all cumulative 
deaths from international terrorism between 1988 and 2000 (Enders and Sandler 2002). In 
response, the Western countries made efforts to increase security at home, thus, raised the 
price of executing a terrorist attack on their territories. Simultaneously, the United States 
declared the Global War on Terrorism, which by many fundamentalists has been perceived 
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as a Western crusade against the Muslim world. Furthermore, sending troops to 
Afghanistan, and later to Iraq, have brought “infidels” directly to the terrorists’ homelands, 
hence reduced the cost and increased the ease with which they can be targeted. 
The invasion of Iraq officially ended on 1 May 2003 and gave grounds for further 
raise of terrorism in the Arab world. Justifying the operation by a faulty premise that Iraq 
possessed weapons of mass destruction not only did cause cracks in the Western 
cooperation in combating terrorism, but also boosted the hatred of fundamentalist terrorists 
against the West. The impotence to swiftly bring security to Iraqi people and restore the 
ruined economy increased the grievances of the Muslim world against the United States. 
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Table 1.1. Incidents in Iraq, Israel and Afghanistan (2001 - 2007) 
Year 
All incidents Iraq Afghanistan Israel 
MIPT ITERATE MIPT ITERATE MIPT ITERATE MIPT ITERATE 
2001 205 52 0 0 2 1 79 4 
2002 298 130 0 0 13 5 106 13 
2003 276 164 46 25 33 12 52 7 
2004 395 234 246 133 24 12 6 4 
2005 311 109 177 45 30 13 4 0 
2006 241 83 75 12 30 8 55 3 
2007 149 91 48 6 11 15 49 2 
Total 1875 863 592 221 143 66 351 33 
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Table 1.2. Comparison of findings in Enders and Sandler (2006) with my results 
Incident type and 
country class 
E&S 
(2006) 
Result confirmed E&S 
(2006) 
Result confirmed 
ITERATE MIPT ITERATE MIPT 
Fundamentalist terrorism (FUND) The end of the Cold War (POST) 
All 
incidents 
World rise yes* yes decline yes yes 
LIC rise yes* yes decline no no 
MIC decline no no decline yes yes 
HIC no effect yes no () decline yes yes 
Casualty 
incidents 
World no effect yes yes no effect yes yes 
LIC no effect yes no () no effect no () yes 
MIC decline maybe maybe no effect no () yes 
HIC no effect yes no () no effect yes no () 
With a 
U.S. target 
World no effect yes yes no effect yes yes 
LIC rise maybe maybe decline no no 
MIC decline maybe maybe decline maybe yes 
HIC no effect yes no () decline yes yes 
Casualty 
incidents 
with a 
U.S. target 
World no effect yes no () decline yes yes 
LIC no effect yes yes no effect no () no () 
MIC decline maybe no decline yes yes 
HIC no effect yes no () decline maybe yes 
Permanent effect of 9/11 (SEPT)  (Dp) 
All 
incidents 
World no effect yes yes decline yes maybe 
LIC no effect yes yes decline yes maybe 
MIC no effect no () yes decline yes maybe 
HIC no effect yes no () no effect yes yes 
Casualty 
incidents 
World no effect yes yes no effect yes no () 
LIC no effect yes yes decline yes maybe 
MIC no effect yes yes no effect no () yes 
HIC no effect yes yes rise yes yes 
With a 
U.S. target 
World no effect yes yes decline yes maybe 
LIC rise maybe maybe decline yes maybe 
MIC rise maybe maybe no effect no () yes 
HIC rise maybe maybe no effect yes yes 
Casualty 
incidents 
with a 
U.S. target 
World rise maybe maybe no effect yes no () 
LIC rise maybe maybe no effect no () yes 
MIC rise maybe maybe no effect no () no () 
HIC rise maybe maybe rise yes yes 
* significant at 10 per cent confidence level,  /  denotes rise / drop in the 
series 
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Table 1.3. Estimated break dates and coefficients 
Time 
series 
p 
Break 
date 
Sup-
Wald 
5 per 
cent 
crit. 
value 
R
2
 a10 a11 a12 a20 a21 a22 a23 
Long-run mean 
before 
break 
after 
break 
All countries (extended series) 
All 
incidents 
4 2004:2 17.69 17.27 0.93 
21.74*** 0.39*** 0.28*** 180.76*** 0.4* -0.01 -0.37*** 
65.88 184.45 
(4.39) (3.76) (3.98) (2.60) (1.68) (-0.06) (-2.62) 
Casualty 
incidents 
4 2004:2 18.33 17.27 0.94 
2.83* 0.64*** 0.27** 130.76*** 0.3 -0.44** 
 
29.34 114.76 
(1.81) (4.92) (2.52) (2.67) (1.20) (-1.93) 
 Iraq (extended series) 
All 
incidents 
5 2004:2 54.83 19.27 0.96 
0.24 1.85*** -0.89*** 183.04*** -1.02*** 0.80** 
 
5.61
+
 149.34 
(1.08) (11.67) (-3.61) (2.54) (-3.75) (2.52) 
 Casualty 
incidents 
4 2004:2 19.15 17.27 0.95 
0.13 1.95*** -0.86* 127.31*** -0.98*** 0.67 
 
-1.54
+
 96.67 
(0.88) (7.36) (-1.89) (2.57) (-2.84) (1.33)   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
+
 Value not different from zero. 
Note: p - number of coefficients allowed to change when testing for breaks; all regressions are run on the 1968:1 - 2007:4 sample; t-statistics based on robust 
standard errors in parentheses; a10 is the intercept before the change and a20 is the post-change intercept; a1i denotes pre-change coefficients; a2i relates to post-
change coefficients; Ljung – Box Q test is applied to rule out serial correlation in estimated residuals. 
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Table 1.4. OLS and NB estimates for all incidents 
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Table 1.5. OLS and NB estimates for casualty incidents 
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Table 1.6. OLS and NB estimates for incidents against a U.S. target 
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Table 1.7. OLS and NB estimates for casualty incidents with a U.S. target 
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Figure 1.1. Incidents by Income Class (quarterly totals) 
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Figure 1.2. Casualty incidents by Income Class 
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Figure 1.3. Incidents against a U.S. target by Income Class 
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Figure 1.4. OLS estimates and 95% confidence intervals for all incidents and casualty incidents 
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Figure 1.5. Estimates and 95% confidence intervals for incidents involving U.S. targets 
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Figure 1.6. Extended terrorism series and estimated break periods 
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Chapter 2 
Fatality Sensitivity in Coalition Countries 
A study of British, Polish and Australian Public Opinion on the Iraq War 
 
2.1. Introduction  
Within the past several years the war in Iraq, which began on 20 March 2003, has occupied 
news services and national agendas of many countries. The invasion led by the United 
States was justified by, what later appeared to be misguided, claims of Iraq’s alleged 
possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and perceived threat of Saddam 
Hussein’s regime to America and her allies. The swift and triumphant invasion had rid the 
world of a gory dictatorship, however it was soon followed by a bloody insurgency which 
within seven years claimed lives of over 100,000 civilians (Iraq Body Count 2010) and 
4,700 coalition soldiers (iCasualties.org 2010). The Multi-National Force, henceforth MNF, 
which became responsible for military operations in the country after the initial invasion, 
included troops from nearly 40 countries and at its peak during the 2007 surge comprised of 
176,000 personnel (Lanza 2010). However, only four countries participated directly in the 
major combat phase, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Poland, and as 
such were active in Iraq from March 2003. The public opinion in the latter three countries 
and its reaction to violence in Iraq constitutes the subject of this chapter. 
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 The decision to commit armed forces to war belongs to the most vital decisions any 
government or nation can make. Military operations require public support, which is 
particularly important in democracy. It is the citizenry who pays the price of war with their 
lives, health and taxes, hence, knowledge of factors influencing public opinion is central to 
providing and sustaining support for government’s actions. It gives policy makers 
indications into what is permissible and what is intolerable from a political point of view. 
As a result, a study of public opinion regarding armed conflict is important from both 
academic and political perspective.  
Although there is a vast body of literature on attitudes of the American public to the 
use of military force (e.g. Mueller 1971; Gartner and Segura 1998; Gelpi, Feaver et al. 
2006), few studies analyze war-related opinion in other countries. To my best knowledge, 
there has been no research dedicated to the reactions of public opinion in coalition countries 
to violence associated with their involvement in external conflicts. In this chapter, I refer to 
coalition countries as those that are not a core force behind military operations, but 
nonetheless send their troops to support a combat mission initiated by another state. 
Consequently, I concentrate on three countries, United Kingdom, Poland and Australia, that 
committed their troops to the invasion of Iraq under the American command from its very 
beginning and remained there for subsequent years. Their forces, although only a fraction 
of the numbers deployed by the United States, were among the largest sent by the MNF 
members (Blanchard and Dale 2007). Their role was further emphasized by granting them 
command of two multinational divisions: the South-East to Great Britain and Central-South 
to Poland. The choice of the countries for the study was also influenced by the availability 
of opinion polls conducted regularly among those countries’ citizenry.  
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 There is a need for a study into determinants of public mood in coalition countries 
concerning their engagement in armed conflict as the patterns governing opinion here may 
differ from those typical for coalition leaders. The possible reasons behind dissimilar 
reactions to events in the theatre of war stem from the very different degree of political and 
military involvement. Those countries only support the ongoing operations and therefore 
their responsibility and risks are lesser than those of the coalition leader. Their withdrawal 
from a combat mission is unlikely to have any pivotal impact on the overall outcome of the 
war and the consequences of such a move would be mostly limited to a more strained 
relationship with the United States. Irrespective of the performance of the supporting 
forces, international condemnation in an event of failure is most likely to concentrate on the 
coalition leader. This way, even if the Iraq war was lost, the blame would be limited largely 
to the United States, not other MNF members. Being in such a “comfortable” situation, 
governments and citizenry of the supporting states may see a bigger divergence between 
their national interests and the war operations. Not being a super-power, smaller countries 
are unlikely to feel and act like a “world’s policeman” and their interest in the global 
politics may be of a narrower scope than that of the United States. For instance, Poland and 
Australia do not have traditions of large combat missions aimed at conquering remote 
regions or regime changes. Furthermore, the two countries are not exposed to international 
terrorism as much as the United States and Great Britain (see MIPT 2008), therefore their 
gains from toppling a terrorism supporting regime are proportionately smaller. The need for 
a research into the public opinion of war supporting states is further aggravated by the fact 
that previous studies characterize conflicts by the patterns of accumulation of U.S. soldier 
deaths (e.g. Mueller 1971; Gartner and Segura 1998). Because of a smaller size and a 
different nature of deployment, the pattern of casualty accumulation is likely to be different 
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among the coalition troops. For instance, the death toll among American soldiers amounted 
to 2.5 per cent of the country’s maximum deployment in the post-invasion period. The 
corresponding number for the United Kingdom and Poland was approximately 1 per cent, 
and it was negligible for Australia (Blanchard and Dale 2007; iCasualties.org 2010). This 
difference is an outcome of the fact that soldiers from the countries in question were likely 
to participate in less dangerous operations, and Australian troops were kept away from life 
threatening actions (Lalor 2007).  
 I employ an error correction model (ECM) to analyze how the war opinion is 
influenced by combat deaths and a magnitude of terrorism in Iraq. This method offers two 
considerable advantages over the extant work. First, it tackles the problems of 
nonstationarity which plague opinion and fatality series. Second, it has a long memory and 
a shock in one period is allowed to affect time series throughout subsequent periods. It is 
expected that an increased fatality rate at one period results in a rise of war opposition. 
Although in subsequent periods the death toll may be much lower, the public may be 
influenced by the memory of earlier events and unwilling to scale down their opposition to 
the level suggested by the smaller death rate in the most recent time interval. In other 
words, an effect of a jump in fatality series on war opinion is likely to take more than one 
period to die out. This property of ECM is particularly desirable and not present in non-
dynamic models used in previous papers (e.g. Mueller 1971; Gartner and Segura 1998; 
Gelpi, Feaver et al. 2006).  
 Since governments are chiefly concerned with avoiding political sanctions for their 
military endeavours, and less with maintaining war support (Klarevas 2002), I use 
opposition scores as a dependent variable. This way, the obtained results should be of more 
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use for policy makers. Soldier deaths and deaths in terrorist attacks along with dummies 
representing selected events are used as explanatory variables. I distinguish between 
fatalities and casualties. Fatalities refer to soldiers killed in action or individuals 
slaughtered in terrorist attacks. Casualties are a broader measure and consist of soldiers 
either killed or injured in action. I expect the public to be sensitive to losses of their 
national troops and the frequency and severity of terrorist incidents in Iraq. The former 
represents a direct cost of the war to a nation, while the intensity of terrorism may be 
considered as a measure of war progress, where more violence signals failing efforts. Such 
reasoning is in line with the cost-benefit decision making framework, where the public is 
supposed to consider both sides of the equation before forming their opinion. I do not 
expect total deaths suffered by all coalition nations to have a significant impact on war 
opinion. Members of the public are unlikely to base their views on such information 
because news services do not report it on regular basis. Similarly, I do not expect the public 
to have a precise knowledge of the number of people killed by terrorists. However, news 
services provide frequent information on terrorist attacks in Iraq and thus create a 
perception of the intensity of terrorism.  
The empirical analysis returns results consistent with the expectations. However, I 
confirm a significant negative impact of soldier deaths only for the United Kingdom. The 
lack of a corresponding effect in Poland should be attributed to a small number of soldier 
fatalities, which left the opinion dominated by other factors, including terrorism in Iraq. 
This aspect of sensitivity could not be tested for Australia because only one soldier died in 
a non-hostile accident during the polling period. The public in all three countries appears to 
be sensitive to the information on the number of people killed in terrorist attacks, which 
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confirms the line of reasoning in Chapter 1. The Poles, who were highly antagonistic to the 
war at its onset, significantly reduced their opposition after the invasion ended in May 
2003. This could have been helped by the fact that the country did not incur any human 
losses during the first two months of the war and the benefit of defeating the brutal 
dictatorship seemed to have been achieved at a small cost. The British public responded in 
a similar manner after the capture of Saddam Hussein, which again must have been 
perceived as a war success. The opposition in both countries sharply increased after the 
release of the torture pictures from Abu Ghraib. Here however, part of the effect may have 
come from the Madrid bombings of March 2004, which happened in the same polling 
period. Surprisingly, I do not find any significant effect of the London bombings of 7 July 
2005 on the British war opposition.  
The results presented in this study can be interpreted as a policy-relevant guidance 
for governments considering contribution of troops to a multinational war coalition. In 
particular, it identifies the channels that affect the war-related views of the citizenry, and 
therefore should become a focus of policy makers’ attention. For example, it confirms that 
scandals such as torture in Abu Ghraib prison are very costly in terms of public attitude and 
their effect is difficult to reverse. It also shows that public is responsive to deaths of Iraqis 
suffered from terrorism. Hence, maintaining war support requires an effective counter-
terrorist strategy as a part of the war effort. This implication is important also for the 
coalition leader, the United States, in whose interest it is to maintain positive war attitudes 
among the public across coalition countries in order to keep those states committed to the 
military intervention.  
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 The reminder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section offers a 
literature review, which is followed by a short discussion of the rationale provided by the 
coalition governments to support their involvement in the war. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 present 
data sources and properties. Sections 2.6 and 2.7 discuss the estimation method and results. 
Discussion and concluding remarks are offered in Sections 2.8 and 2.9. 
2.2. Literature review 
As already mentioned, the literature on the subject pays most attention to reactions of the 
American public to the use of armed forces. In his pioneering work, Mueller (1971) uses 
log of cumulative soldier deaths to analyze public attitudes to the Korean and Vietnam 
wars. His main finding is that the support for the war dropped in proportion to the log of 
cumulative casualties. He concludes that Americans are  sensitive  to  relatively  small  
losses  in  the  early  stages of war,  but  only to  large  losses  in  later  stages. A study by 
Gartner and Segura (1998) disagrees with Mueller’s findings. They point out that Mueller 
(1971)  does not control for time and therefore his model is unable to account for war 
weariness (a duration-based opposition). They argue that the level of marginal casualties 
has a better explanatory power than cumulative casualties when marginal casualties are 
increasing; when they are decreasing – log of cumulative casualties gives better results.  
 Numerous studies seek explanation to changes in war support in factors other than 
accumulating casualties. Jentleson (1998) explains the public support for the use of military 
force using the principal policy objectives for which the military force is being used. He 
suggests that the public may be less sensitive to casualties in certain types of military 
interventions. In his study, Berinsky (2007) considers the “elite cue theory” according to 
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which opinion is shaped not by events such as cumulative casualties, but by a degree of 
consensus or divergence in elites’ opinions regarding the war. He suggests that when 
political leaders share their support for the conflict, the public tends to support it too. A lack 
of consensus brings the polarization effect which is demonstrated by a split in the public 
opinion. The influences of the principal policy objectives and elite cues are also 
investigated by Klarevas (2002), who additionally considers the nature of media coverage 
of a conflict. He concludes that Americans are more likely to support military actions if 
they are a part of a multilateral operation.  
 There have been several studies into the determinants of the American public 
opinion during the recent Iraq war. For instance, Mueller (2005) argues that the drop in the 
American public support for the Iraq war was faster than during the wars in Vietnam and 
Korea. He attributes the higher sensitivity to war casualties to the fact that the public 
perceives the stakes in Iraq as less important than during the former conflicts
1
.  Gelpi, 
Feaver and Reifler (2006) analyze the influence of American casualties on the presidential 
rating. They consider log of cumulative casualties separately for different phases of the 
conflict and find that the impact of deaths on the presidential approval varies between the 
stages of the war. Overall, they suggest that casualties are not as important as expectations 
of success of the military mission. Gelpi et al. (2006) is an early study and covers only the 
period until November 2004, therefore its results should be taken with caution when 
                                                 
1
 Several explanations to the problem of higher casualty sensitivity in recent years have been suggested. 
Luttwak (1995) attributes it to the decreasing birth rate. Sapolsky and Shapiro (1996) suggest that casualty 
intolerance has urged changes in military technology, which consequently have strengthened casualty phobia 
by cultivating not viable expectations of the possibility of low human cost of conflict. Another likely culprit is 
the real-time television reporting of military operations. Livingston (1997) argues that vivid pictures and time 
proximity of reports make deaths more shocking, and therefore increase the degree of public casualty 
sensitivity. This finding is not fully supported by Aday (2010), who argues that media exert significant 
influence only in conjunction with elite consensus.  
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generalizing for the whole duration of the war. There are at least two more problems 
associated with this study. Since news services tend to report the cumulative death counts 
from the beginning of the war, it is unreasonable to expect the public to form their opinion 
for respective phases separately. Furthermore, using presidential ratings is problematic as 
they are influenced by numerous factors and it is difficult to extract the pure war 
component (see also Klarevas, Gelpi et al. 2006).  
 This study is closest to the work of Mueller (1971) and Gartner and Segura (1998) 
as it identifies human cost of war as a chief determinant of public opinion. However, it uses 
a more efficient estimation method which deals with problems typical for opinion poll and 
fatality series. It also allows the public to react to deaths incurred by citizens of the invaded 
country.  
2.3. The build-up to the war 
In order to obtain a public mandate for the military intervention, the governments of the 
three countries had to convince their citizenry to the objectives underlying the invasion. 
The used rhetoric reflected that of the American administration and emphasized the need to 
disarm Iraq of WMD, end regime’s support for terrorists, and bring freedom to the Iraqi 
people. The public was assured of legality of military actions, and reminded of Iraq’s 
failure to disarm, and the deception game it had played with UN weapon inspectors for 12 
years since the first Gulf war (Blair 2003; Bush 2003; Howard 2003; Kwasniewski 2003).  
In Britain, the war objectives fit into Tony Blair’s doctrine laid down in Chicago in 
1999, which justified military intervention based on values, even without an approval from 
the UN Security Council. According to him, it is justified to intervene on humanitarian 
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grounds, even when the intervening country is not directly threatened, because in the inter-
dependent world, self-interest of one nation is “allied to the interests of others” (Blair 
2004). In the post-9/11 world a special emphasis was put on risks associated with Iraq’s 
alleged links to terrorist organizations. The politicians were drawing dark visions of WMD 
falling into hands of terrorists and picturing the invasion of Iraq as a part of the War on 
Terrorism. President Kwasniewski of Poland recalled the nation’s victims of the 9/11 
attacks (Kwasniewski 2003), while Australians were reminded by Prime Minister Howard 
that they were “as much targets [of terrorism] as any other Western country and its people” 
(Howard 2003). Finally, the public was told of the dire humanitarian conditions under 
Saddam’s regime, where 60 per cent of the population had been dependent on food aid 
programmes, malnutrition and diseases had been killing thousands of children every year, 
and hundreds of thousands had been driven from their homes or murdered. The coalition 
governments pledged far-going humanitarian and reconstruction efforts in building free 
Iraq (Blair 2003; Howard 2003; Kwasniewski 2003). The Australian Prime Minister 
stressed the importance of setting an example to other rogue countries with intentions of 
developing WMD, and deterring them from supporting terrorist groups. He also gave a 
close security alliance with the United States as a reason and highlighted America’s vital 
role in maintaining Australia’s long-term security (Howard 2003).  
Similar reasoning was echoed in Poland, where the government was determined to 
support the United States even at the price of straining relations with Germany and France, 
the sponsors of Poland’s accession to NATO and the European Union (Economist 2003). 
Polish leaders drew a picture of benefits flowing for the country from the military 
involvement. The closer relations with the United States were expected to increase Poland’s 
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importance in international politics and strengthen Polish position in relations with the EU 
and Russia. Moreover, the government sources estimated that the economy could gain 2 to 
3 billion dollars from potential business contracts within several years, which would create 
over 300,000 jobs (Nowakowski 2003). In spite of a very deep pro-American sentiment in 
the society, the ally rhetoric and a vision of economic benefits, the Polish government did 
not manage to secure majority’s support for the involvement in the invasion. Effectively, 
the promise of benefits that have never realized could have added up to disillusionment and 
war weariness, which later might have translated into falling support for the war.  
This section briefly summarized the arguments used by the three governments to 
justify the armed intervention in Iraq. The following section addresses data sources and 
describes public opinion at the onset of the invasion. 
2.4. Data 
The data is drawn from several sources. The information on the opposition to the Iraq war 
was collected from YouGov (2007), CBOS (2007) and Roy Morgan (2003-2006) for the 
United Kingdom, Poland and Australia, respectively. The British were asked the following 
question: “Do you think the United States and Britain are/were right or wrong to take 
military action against Iraq?”, forty times between 18 March 2003 and 7 June 2007 (see 
Panel 1 of Figure 2.1).  The survey was conducted with varying frequency on around 2,000 
people. In 2003 and 2004, when the Iraq war dominated public debate, YouGov carried out 
22 and 11 polls, respectively. In 2005 the number fell to three polls, and in 2006 and 2007 
there were only two surveys each year. Until May 2004 the majority of respondents saw the 
military action against Iraq as a right thing. As the invasion began, 53 per cent were in 
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favour of the use of military force and 39 per cent were against it. The support for the 
invasion reached its maximum of 66 per cent on 10 April 2003. The same survey showed 
the lowest opposition of 29 per cent. The gap between the two fractions had been narrowing 
over following twelve months. The poll conducted after the release of pictures of torture on 
Iraqi prisoners in late April 2004 showed that, for the first time, the majority did not 
support the war. The fraction of those who perceived the conflict as wrong reached 60 per 
cent in April 2007, at the same time the “right” answer was given by 26 per cent.  
The Australian public was asked less frequently about their opinion on the 
involvement in the Iraq war. The most consistent survey was conducted by Roy Morgan 
between 19 March 2003 and 20 April 2006, typically on a sample of over 500 respondents. 
The question: “Now thinking about Iraq — In your opinion should Australia have a 
military presence in Iraq?” was put forward ten times (see Panel 3 of Figure 2.1). The 
Australian opinion remained split fairly in the middle over the polling period, with 
differences between yes’s and no’s oscillating between 2 and 5 per cent. The situation 
changed in 2006, when the opposition of 59 per cent exceeded the number of supporters by 
24 per cent. Unfortunately, there are no polls available that could reflect the effects of 
revelations suggesting that the Australian government had sent troops to Iraq under the 
condition that its wheat trade with the country was protected, and in order to strengthen its 
commercial position in dealings with the United States (see Baker 2006; BBC News 2007).  
Poland was the only country of the three, where the opponents of sending troops to 
Iraq were always in majority. CBOS conducted 31 surveys in which a typical sample of 
around 1,000 adults was asked “Do you support the participation of Polish soldiers in the 
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mission in Iraq?”2. The question was a part of regular monthly polls carried out between 
March 2003 and March 2005. Thereafter it was asked two more times in 2005, once in 
2006 and four times in 2007 (see Panel 2 of Figure 2.1). The initial opposition of 73 per 
cent fell down to 45 per cent in May 2003, or shortly after the end of the invasion. This is 
also the time, when the support for sending troops to Iraq reached its peak of 45 per cent. 
As the insurgency had begun and sectarian violence engulfed Iraq, Poles grew less 
comfortable with their country’s involvement in the military operations. The opposition 
bounced back to the 70 per cent level in the second quarter of 2004 and exceeded 80 per 
cent in 2007. Notably, neither the Polish nor the Australian polls did show the “rally-
around-the-flag” effect described by Mueller (1971) and Gelpi, Feaver et al. (2006). 
Data for the explanatory variables is taken chiefly from two sources: iCasualties.org 
(2010) and the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base
3
 (2008). The latter draws from open 
sources, such as news services, and provides information on acts of terrorism defined as 
violence for political purposes by sub-national actors, designed to induce an atmosphere of 
fear and anxiety in order to influence behaviour of an audience beyond that of the 
immediate victims (MIPT 2002). MIPT recorded 9,656 terrorist incidents (593 classified as 
international and 9,063 as domestic) that took place in Iraq between 20 March 2003 and 31 
December 2007, and caused 26,147 fatalities
4
. This number represents mostly civilian 
deaths as the database concentrates on non-combatant targets; only 0.6 per cent of incidents 
                                                 
2
 Original wording of the question was: “Czy popiera Pan(i) udział żołnierzy polskich w operacji w 
Iraku, czy też nie?” 
3
 The MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB) was a joint project of the Oklahoma City National 
Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism and the RAND Corporation. TKB ceased its operations on 
31 March 2008. The RAND Corporation still keeps on collecting new data, but this is no longer available 
through the MIPT website. 
4
 Observations on deaths are missing for 685 attacks.  
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recorded in Iraq involved military targets. The incidence of terrorism in Iraq seems to be 
particularly large when compared to the overall number of 10,237 international terrorist 
attacks recorded globally within forty years to 2007. I use the number of fatalities as an 
explanatory variable because, although it shows the same effects as the number of attacks, 
it provides better goodness of fit of my model. This suggests that public does not react only 
to the number of attacks, but is also sensitive to their severity.  
iCasualties.org, also known as the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, is an independent 
online service containing information on MNF fatalities in the Iraq war. The website 
provides such details as the date of an incident, victim’s country of origin, rank, age, a 
name and location of military unit, and a cause and place of death. This information is 
gathered from news reports and press releases issued by the U.S. Department of Defense, 
the U.S. Central Command, the MNF, and the British Ministry of Defence. As of 31 
August 2010, the database listed 4,734 fatalities with a vast majority of 4,416 incurred by 
the United States. The United Kingdom, Poland and Australia lost 179, 23 and 2 
servicemen, respectively. The death toll in 2003 amounted to 580 troops, including 53 
British and 2 Polish combatants. During the four following years, MNF was losing around 
900 soldiers each year, followed by a steep decline to 322 and 150 fatalities in 2008 and 
2009, respectively. The period from 2004 to 2007 brought on average 30 fatalities a year 
among the British troops and 5 among the Polish. Australia incurred two casualties in non-
hostile accidents, one in 2005 and another one in 2006. 
The analysis of the impact of soldier casualties on public opinion is complemented 
by the use of the data on numbers of British and Australian troops wounded in Iraq. The 
information on the former has been obtained from the British Ministry of Defence (DASA 
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2009) under the Freedom of Information Act 2000. In particular, I use the monthly total 
number of soldiers classified as Very Seriously Injured (VSI) and Seriously Injured (SI). 
There were 222 cases falling into these two categories in total. In addition, I have obtained 
a monthly breakdown figures on the number of Australian Defence Force (ADF) soldiers 
wounded in action in Iraq between 2003 and 2010. The information was provided upon 
request by the Australian Minister for Veterans’ Affairs and Defence Personnel (Griffin 
2010). In total, 28 ADF soldiers suffered injuries while performing their action duties, with 
the highest number of 13 wounded in 2005. I combine this information with the data on 
soldier fatalities from the iCasualties dataset, and generate UK casualty and Australia 
casualty variables, which provide an additional measure of personnel losses incurred by the 
two forces. Unfortunately, in spite of numerous attempts, I have not managed to obtain 
analogous information from either Poland’s government or respective military forces. The 
recent revelations by the national press suggested that neither of the mentioned institutions 
had been recording such information (Górka 2010). 
2.5. Graphical analysis 
Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 provide a graphical comparison of the war opposition in the three 
countries with soldier deaths and fatalities in terrorist attacks that took place in Iraq. The 
plots on the left-hand side present log of cumulative fatalities, and those on right-hand side 
show marginal deaths, which are calculated as a number of fatalities within 120 days 
preceding a poll date. For instance, the observation on 1 May 2005 is a number of fatalities 
that occurred between that day and 1 January 2005
5
. I show the number of soldiers 
                                                 
5
 The choice of 120 days is dictated by a number of reasons. First, the series of marginal fatalities 
obtained for 30, 60, 90 and 180 days are highly correlated, with correlation coefficients between 0.7 and 0.98. 
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wounded in action for Australia, because the country lost only one serviceman in a non-
hostile accident within the period covered by the available surveys (marked in Figure 2.1 
Panel 3b).  
The swift invasion in the first weeks of the conflict was largely regarded as a 
success, which seems the most likely explanation behind the drop in opposition numbers in 
Poland and Great Britain. Thereafter, as Iraq immersed in sectarian violence and the 
insurgency was gaining strength, the public enthusiasm for the war diminished, which is 
reflected in the rising share of those who disapproved of the military operations. The 
insurgency was associated with an increase in fatalities incurred by the coalition countries, 
depicted as log of cumulative soldier deaths and marginal fatalities in Figure 2.1. The 
British death toll swelled already during the invasion period, which left Poland’s forces 
unharmed. Great Britain suffered the highest losses and the fastest accumulation of 
fatalities among the three countries which, given the size of the British contribution to the 
war, is not surprising. The Poles started paying with their lives later that year, and incurred 
highest losses in 2004 and 2005. Australia did not have any wounded-in-action accidents 
until October 2004, and 12 out of 28 cases took place in January 2005. 
Judging by Figure 2.1, British opinion seems to show signs of the “rally-around-the-
flag” effect. Although the casualties are rising rapidly during the first weeks of the 
invasion, the opposition to the war appears relatively small (Panel 1). The lack of human 
losses on the Polish and Australian sides prevent from drawing a similar conclusion for 
these countries. The plots of the log of cumulative fatalities suggest that it may have a 
                                                                                                                                                    
Second, the series based on 120-day intervals exhibit the strongest cointegration with the war opposition 
series. Third, it makes my analysis comparable with other work on casualties and public opinion (see Gartner, 
Segura 1998). 
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potential to explain changes in the war-related public opinion. This is particularly true for 
the periods of steady rise in opposition after summer 2004. However, the possible 
relationship between log fatalities and war opposition is less clear in the earlier periods, 
when the opinion is more volatile and accumulation of soldier deaths more rapid. The 
marginal fatalities, depicted on the right-hand side of Figure 2.1, may explain declines in 
opposition better than the log of cumulative casualties. This is due to the fact that, unlike 
cumulative values, marginal casualties are not monotonic and can fluctuate with opinion
6
. 
The relationship between the war opinion and marginal casualties seems to be weaker in the 
later months, when fatalities stay relatively low and opposition gradually increases. 
Because of very few data points available, it is impossible to draw permitted conclusions 
from the graphical analysis of the Australian series. The most noticeable point in Panel 3 is 
an increase in the war opposition following the first death among ADF soldiers. 
Nonetheless, it is hard to attribute that change to this fatal event as it was a non-hostile 
accident. It is likely that some other factors, beyond the scope of this study, contributed to 
changes in Australian opinion. 
The three coalition countries suffered only a fraction of deaths incurred by the 
United States, whose public opinion constitutes a focus of most studies (e.g. Mueller 2005; 
Gelpi, Feaver et al. 2006). Therefore, I come up with another measure of violence and 
instability in Iraq: a number of people killed in terrorist attacks. I use this variable to test 
the hypothesis that public in the coalition countries is sensitive to occurrence and intensity 
of terrorism in Iraq (as suggested in Chapter 1). Since soldier deaths are relatively rare, 
                                                 
6
 See Gartner and Segura (1998) for a comprehensive discussion of advantages of marginal casualties 
over logged casualties. 
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frequent and gory terrorist attacks are likely to occupy news services more often and as 
such may affect public opinion to a greater extent. Figure 2.2 demonstrates logged 
cumulative and marginal deaths from terrorist attacks in Iraq. As before, logged fatalities 
seem to reflect the overall direction of changes in public opinion fairly well. However, due 
to its monotonic nature, the variable fails to explain drops in the opposition, such as the one 
in the United Kingdom in the last quarter of 2003. Marginal fatalities (for 120 days 
preceding a poll date) also appear to reflect the rise in opposition, but additionally they 
seem to mirror downward changes. For instance, the decline in the war unpopularity in 
Britain in 2007 is mirrored by a drop in marginal fatalities, which appears to be particularly 
suggestive. Even changes in Australia’s public opinion seem to somehow follow marginal 
deaths in terrorist attacks. 
The graphical analysis does not provide an answer to whether logged or marginal 
deaths are a better predictor of public opinion, or whether they should be used in 
conjunction as proposed by Gartner and Segura (1998). The problem with logged 
cumulative fatalities is that they are always increasing in time. Although more capable of 
capturing shocks and temporary changes in the intensity of the conflict, the marginal 
fatalities may underperform in capturing long time patterns of the war. It is also likely that 
some exogenous events, for instance the terrorist atrocities in Madrid and London, the 
release of pictures of torture on Iraqi prisoners in 2004, or an election calendar, could exert 
a significant impact on public attitudes towards the war. The following section provides a 
more formal empirical set up for analyzing the effects of above variables on war-related 
public opinion in coalition countries. 
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2.6. Empirical approach 
Many of the previous studies on casualty sensitivity seem to ignore the fact that public 
support as well as casualty series are most likely to be nonstationary. This is true for studies 
by Mueller (1971), Gartner and Segura (1998), Jentleson (1998), and Norpoth (1987). 
Although Gelpi et al. (2006) acknowledge that they have trend stationary series, they fail to 
address the problem sufficiently. Their Prais – Winsten correction solves the problem of 
serial correlation in residuals, however, it does not prove that the series are indeed 
cointegrated or that there is causality between them. A failure to account for the 
nonstationary nature of time series may result in spurious regressions, i.e. misleading 
standard errors may result in a model that shows a relationship that does not exist (Engle 
and Granger 1987). A remedy to this problem is an error correction model (ECM), which is 
based on a notion that a true relationship will be preserved by first differencing, whereas 
spurious one will not survive the process (Greene 2003). The model’s dynamic nature 
captures short-term shifts and long-term trends of public opinion in response to changes in 
explanatory variables, provided that variables cointegrate. In my study, I use a single-
equation ECM, an approach previously applied in analysis of public opinion in Clarke et al. 
(2000), Keele (2007) and Jennings (2009). 
 The model relates current changes in the war opposition to the contemporaneous 
changes in the magnitude of violence (an effect captured by β2), the extent to which the 
series were outside of their equilibrium relationship in the previous period (captured by 
coefficients on lagged variables), and exogenous events. It can be written as follows: 
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(2.1) 
where FATAL is one of the following measures of violence: fatalities among nation’s 
soldiers, all MNF deaths, or killed in terrorist attacks. EVENTS includes the end of the 
invasion of Iraq (1 May 2003), the capture of Saddam Hussein (13 December 2003), the 
terrorist attack in Madrid (11 March 2004), and the revelation of widespread prisoner abuse 
at Abu Ghraib prison (April 2004)
7
. α0 and εt are a constant and an error term, respectively.  
An advantage of using ECM for estimation of unit root processes is ability to 
capture the series’ permanent memory, i.e. allowing the public opinion to be permanently 
affected by the shocks in explanatory variables. This is in contrast to stationary processes in 
which shocks only briefly affect the series in question and any disruptions are followed by 
a quick return to the pre-shock levels. Thus, by preserving long-run information, ECM 
establishes equilibrating relationship between series, which would be lost if one brought 
time series to stationarity through simple differencing (Boef de and Granato 1999). This 
characteristic of ECM is particularly valuable as I expect the impact of violence occurring 
in period t on the public opinion to be dispersed across several following time periods. One 
can imagine a situation in which increased fatality rate at period t causes the war opposition 
to soar. Although the fatalities may be considerably lower in following periods, the public 
may be affected by the memory of the earlier death toll and unwilling to scale down their 
opposition to the level implied by the smaller death rate in the most recent time interval. 
                                                 
7
 I also test for an impact of the Iraqi elections in 2005 and the London bombings of 7 July 2005. 
Nevertheless, estimates of these effects are never significant and therefore are not presented. 
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Panels 1b and 2b of Figure 2.1, where large declines in marginal deaths are not followed by 
immediate downward adjustments of opposition, suggest that such a scenario is plausible 
and a surge in fatalities may have a long lasting effect on the opposition series. 
 The rate of re-equilibration in response to shocks to the long-run equilibrium is 
given by the error-correction parameter, β1. I expect it to be negative because a positive 
value would be reinforcing the disequilibrium instead of correcting it. As Jennings (2009) 
shows, a value of β1 between 0 and -1 indicates that equilibrium shocks are corrected at a 
gradual rate and the dynamic effect eventually dies out. If β1 falls between -1 and -2, then 
the error correction oscillates between positive and negative values but diminishes and 
tends towards zero over time. This results in a process, where in one period public opinion 
overreacts in response to violence in Iraq, but then it under-corrects in the following period, 
eventually returning to its long-run equilibrium. This overreaction may signal that the 
public over-weighs new information. Finally, if β1 is smaller than -2, the correction process 
still oscillates between positive and negative values, but this time it is exploding, i.e. the 
public opinion becomes increasingly detached from the events in Iraq. When analyzing the 
estimation results, one should keep in mind that the poll data used in this study is unevenly 
spaced, which raises questions about the interpretation of the error-correction term. 
Nevertheless, this should not affect validity of coefficients on the remaining exogenous 
variables.  
 The estimation procedure involves the following steps. First, I apply the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron unit root tests to establish whether the opposition and 
fatality series are of the same level of integration. Once I confirm that the series are unit 
root processes, I run cointegrating regressions and test whether obtained residuals are 
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stationary. Having confirmed that the series are cointegrated, I use ordinary least squares 
(OLS) to estimate Equation 2.1 (see Engle and Granger 1987; Boef de and Granato 1999). 
Finally, I use a host of diagnostics to test goodness of fit of estimated models. 
2.7. Results 
Following the insights from the data section, I cannot rule out that both the log of 
cumulative fatalities and marginal fatalities may have explanatory power for the changes in 
the war opposition. I begin the discussion from the results based on the former measure, 
which appears to give better fit of the model than marginal fatalities.  In addition, I consider 
the hypothesis proposed by Gartner and Segura (1998) that marginal casualties explain 
changes in opposition during periods of conflict intensification, but cumulative casualties 
have a greater explanatory power during conflict de-escalation. However, after arranging 
explanatory variables in the way outlined by the two authors, I obtain a poor fit for the data, 
with discouraging model diagnostics, and significant coefficients only for deaths in terrorist 
attacks. Due to the poor performance of such a model, I do not show its results in the 
reminder of this chapter. 
 Table 2.1 presents results of estimating Equation 2.1, where FATAL is measured as 
a log of cumulative fatalities of a specific type and the dependent variable, OPPOSITION, 
is measured in the 0 – 100 point metric scale. The “National fatalities” variable contains 
deaths incurred by either British or Polish troops. Model diagnostics displayed in the 
bottom of Table 2.1 indicate that all models but one offer reasonable fit to the data. Model 
6 suffers from heteroskedasticity (Breusch-Pagan χ2 = 7.97), which can be attributed to the 
lack of explanatory power of the independent variable, cumulative Polish fatalities. 
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Obtained coefficients behave as anticipated. The error-correction parameter 
(OPPOSITIONt-1) in models 1 – 3, 5 and 8 suggest that shocks to the British and Polish 
opposition inflicted by fatalities in Iraq are gradually corrected and dissipate over time. 
However, as mentioned in the previous section, the interpretation of this coefficient is 
problematic due to uneven spacing of the poll data. Interestingly, in some of the models the 
parameter is close to -1, which actually suggests a static model.  
Assuming that the estimates of the error correction parameter are correct and 
interpretable, a conventional analysis would indicate that shocks in model 5 are corrected at 
a rate of 98 per cent. This means that only 2 per cent of an effect remains after one period 
and 0.04 per cent after two periods. Thus, although the public does not forget past fatalities 
when forming opinion, their effect dies out relatively fast. In four models, mostly on 
Poland’s side of Table 2.1, the error correction parameter is lesser than -1, suggesting 
hypersensitive nature of public opinion to fatalities. Model 8 explains the highest 
proportion of variability in the Polish series and appears to provide the best fit. It suggests 
that shocks to long-run equilibrium between the opposition and fatalities in terrorist attacks 
are corrected at a rate of 104 per cent. Thus, the Polish public “overreacts” to the news of 
fatalities by 4 per cent within the first period. This is then corrected over ensuing periods, 
with a 0.16 per cent correction after two periods, a negligible overcorrection after three 
years, and eventually reaching the long-run equilibrium state. As models 2-3 and 7-8 
indicate, public in both countries respond to increases in MNF soldier fatalities and 
terrorism intensity in Iraq, however, the Poles seem to be more sensitive to incoming 
information. This could be caused by the fact that never before had Poland contributed to a 
military mission abroad on such a scale, and the public could be paying more attention to 
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this novelty, seeing news of victims as more sensational than people in war-experienced 
Britain. Similarly, Poles’ long-run hypersensitivity to the number of terrorism victims may 
be influenced by the fact that Poland has no experience of international terrorism and going 
to Iraq was perceived by many as an invitation for Islamic extremists to launch attacks in 
the country that praises itself for being terrorism-free. According to polls conducted 
between June 2003 and October 2007 (CBOS 2007), on average 75 per cent of respondents 
deemed that due to its involvement in Iraq, Poland would become a target of such attacks. 
In October 2004, when 82 per cent of Poles feared terrorist attacks, the British public 
seemed a little bit less concerned. “Only” 60 per cent were anxious about an increased 
threat from global terrorism and 56 per cent felt less safe as a result of the war (YouGov 
2004). Thriving terrorism in Iraq seemed likely to contribute to those fears and 
consequently increase the war opposition.  
 Model 1 implies that increases in cumulative British soldier deaths have a 
significant contemporaneous effect on the public, with one per cent increase in fatalities 
being followed by a 0.16 per cent rise in war opposition (β2 = 15.94). A positive lagged 
coefficient confirms that an increase in fatalities in current period will have an effect on 
opposition over subsequent periods. A long-run multiplier of 10.74, shown in Table 2.2, 
informs that the total short- and long-run effect of a one per cent increase in fatalities is a 
boost of 0.1 per cent in war opposition. Although these values may seem small at first, they 
translate into substantial fatality sensitivity. For example, a change from 10 to 20 fatalities 
is associated with a 10 per cent increase in war opposition. In the next step, I test whether 
deaths incurred by all MNF nations or fatalities from terrorist attacks could have impact on 
the war opposition in the United Kingdom. Models 2 and 3 give an affirmative answer to 
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that question and show that increases in either cumulative measure of violence could 
contribute to a rise in opposition. Since introducing the three violence variables 
sequentially produces significant coefficients, I enter them simultaneously in model 4. In 
order to avoid double counting of British deaths, they are excluded from “All fatalities”. 
Although British soldier deaths and terrorism preserve their significance (lagged national 
fatalities and differenced terrorism are significant at 10 per cent confidence level), the non-
British MNF fatalities lose their explanatory power. That is in line with the expectation that 
public does not base their opinion on total coalition fatalities as this information is not 
readily available in daily media. Thus, while the variable captures some cost of the war 
(through high correlation with national fatalities), the two other series reflect public 
sensitivity better. Finally, model 5 confirms the significance of the short- and long-run 
impact of terrorist violence on the war-related opinion in the United Kingdom. However, 
removing “All fatalities” from the model reduced the influence of British fatalities to short-
run effect, which now is significant only at 10 per cent confidence level. These results are 
largely reproduced when I use logged cumulative British casualties (soldiers killed plus 
wounded) as a measure of violence (see Table 2.4). In fact, I cannot reject the hypothesis of 
coefficients equality across the two specifications at any conventional significance level.  
 Models 6 – 8 offer a sequential introduction of the violence variables and their 
impact on the Polish war opposition. One cannot infer about effects of fatalities among 
Polish soldiers, as its coefficients never reach significant levels. Nevertheless, it does not 
mean that the Polish opinion is insensitive to losses among the nation’s troops. The model 
might be not picking up any effects because deaths among Polish soldiers are relatively few 
(23 over a five year period). The regressions return positive long-run effects on opposition 
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caused by changes in series depicting cumulative deaths among all MNF troops and 
cumulative fatalities in terrorist incidents. Total effects given by the long-run multipliers in 
Table 2.2 suggest that a one per cent increase in one of these series leads to a boost in war 
opposition by approximately 0.08 and 0.03 per cent, respectively. Including all measures of 
violence in multivariate regressions returns no significant coefficients. Model 10 limits the 
hypothesized effects to terrorism and Polish fatalities. As before, the latter variable is 
insignificant, but the model confirms the long lasting influence of terrorism and 
additionally brings its short-run effect to significance.  
 Table 2.1 provides also estimates of changes in war opposition induced by selected 
events. The first of them, the end of the invasion of Iraq in early May 2003, coincided with 
a significant reduction in opposition (and a rise in support, CBOS 2007) in Poland. The 
rapid defeat of the Iraqi regime was perceived as a major success and the country did not 
lose any of its troops during that phase. This seems to explain the 26 per cent drop in the 
opposition numbers. Similarly, the capture of Saddam Hussein in December 2003, another 
success of the military operations, reduced the British opposition by approximately 5 per 
cent, and had less evident impact in Poland. All models in Table 2.1 confirm significance of 
the “Torture / March 11” variable, which encompasses effects of the terrorist attack in 
Madrid in March 2004 and the release of Abu Ghraib torture pictures. The temporal 
proximity of those two events and frequency with which polls were being conducted 
prevent me from distinguishing between their individual effects. The growth in opposition 
could be attributed to one or both of the following incidents. First, the evidence of soldiers’ 
misconduct may have increased the dislike of the war among those members of the public 
who believed that the war was about improving Iraqi lives and freeing them from brutal 
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dictatorship. Second, the March 11 bombings, which were perceived to be a result of 
Spain’s involvement in Iraq, may have increased the fears among the British and Polish 
public of being punished for the countries’ war participation with similar attacks. Thus, one 
cannot rule out that the March 11 attack boosted opposition by increasing the number of 
those demanding withdrawal from Iraq. 
Marginal fatalities  
Table 2.3 presents estimates based on marginal fatalities representing the number of deaths 
of a given type that occurred within 120 days prior to a poll date. Models 1 – 6 bear out the 
sizeable impact of the intensity of terrorism in Iraq on British and Polish opinion. 
Nonetheless, they fail to confirm any effects caused by soldier fatalities. It is in line with 
Mueller’s (2005) argument that only cumulative casualties matter, because media report 
deaths as totals since the beginning of the war. Hence, the public may not be aware how 
many troops were killed within a 120-day window. Similarly, I do not expect the public to 
know how many people died in terrorist incidents. However, my argument is that frequent 
and severe attacks influence war-time opinion through their regular and nearly every-day 
appearance in news reports (see also Lee 2011). Over the analyzed polling period, Iraq was 
a stage to an average of six terrorist incidents a day, which claimed 15 lives. They were 
bound to make a more frequent news appearance than deaths of soldiers, which were 
happening at a rate of one in 10 and 75 days for the British and Polish forces, respectively. 
In addition, since MIPT records are based on open sources, such as international news 
services, the database should somewhat reflect media content reaching the public. Thus, the 
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intensity of terrorism could be a signal of war progress which dominates other cost 
measures when soldier fatalities are relatively rare
8
.  
 Analysis of the Australian war opposition is hindered by the small number of data 
points - the most frequent and consistent poll was conducted only ten times. Studies of 
wartime opinion are often plagued by small sample sizes. For instance, Mueller (1971) and 
Gartner and Segura (1998) base their consideration on 25 and 26 observations, while 
Larson (1996) uses a sample as small as three. Although I am aware of the dangers of 
inference from such a small sample, I try to fit my error correction model to the Australian 
data. Proceeding as before, I fail to establish cointegrating relationships between war 
opposition and either MNF fatalities or Australian casualties, which is not surprising after 
the inspection of plots in Figure 2.1. However, I cannot rule out a relationship between 
public opinion and terrorism. The coefficients obtained by using marginal deaths in terrorist 
attacks are shown in model 7 of Table 2.3
9
. The estimates add to the evidence of a 
significant long-run impact of terrorism intensity on opinion in the coalition countries. I do 
not include event variables in model 7 as their meaning would be difficult to interpret 
accurately due to low frequency of polling. Furthermore, including more than one 
intervention variable with so few observations exacerbates the risk of multicolinearity.  
 In summary, using marginal fatalities supports the findings of the effect that 
terrorism in Iraq has on war opposition in the coalition countries. The failure to find a 
                                                 
8
 This argument may not hold for the coalition leader, the United States. The American public is more 
likely to be influenced by their troop losses, which were happening at a rate of 2 a day. In this case, frequent 
reports of soldier deaths are likely to perform better as a predictor of war opposition, as argued by Mueller 
(1971, 2005). 
9
 The log specification also detects a long-run effect of terrorism on war opposition in Australia. 
However, such a model suffers from residual non-normality. 
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relationship between soldier fatalities and the Australian public opinion should not be 
interpreted as a lack of casualty sensitivity. It ought to be attributed to the weaknesses of 
available data and very low casualty rates among Australian soldiers, which make testing 
the casualty sensitivity hypothesis impossible.  
2.8. Discussion 
The results presented in the earlier section offer a number of implications. First, in the 
absence of frequent soldier fatalities, which constitute the most obvious cost of armed 
conflict to a nation, the public is likely to respond to perceived successfulness of a mission 
measured by the ability or disability to bring peace and stability to a troubled nation. Since 
the Iraq war was framed as a part of the war on terror, swelling numbers of terrorist 
incidents and fatalities may serve as an indicator that the coalition efforts are failing. In 
addition, some members of public may have been convinced that attacks are a direct result 
of the MNF presence in Iraq and therefore, their support or ambivalence to the war was 
turned into opposition. Furthermore, mounting terrorist casualties may be interpreted as a 
signal that the cost of achieving war objectives is too high in terms of Iraqi lives. All this 
leads to a conclusion that the public is sensitive not only to their own fatalities but also to 
deaths of Iraqis. This finding somewhat differs from Mueller’s (2005) opinion about the 
American public, which is expected to be responsive only to deaths of U.S. soldiers.  
Second, the public seems to be forming opinion in a consistent and rational way, 
which requires a cost-benefit analysis of the likely war outcome. This notion has been 
affirmed in Gartner and Segura (1998) and Gelpi, Feaver et al. (2006), but rejected by 
Berinsky (2007), who pointed out that the public had too little information to make 
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complex cost-benefit calculations. Nevertheless, it is possible that such an analysis is not 
based on precise knowledge of costs and combat situation, but rather on public’s perception 
of those. Relatively low losses associated with the invasion and its high perceived success 
caused the opposition to deteriorate. This drop may have been helped by people’s desire to 
be seen as supporting “our troops”, and favourable media accounts. According to Lewis 
(2004), nearly two out of three news reports showed coalition troops being welcomed by 
Iraqi people. At the same time they avoided showing graphic images of death and 
destruction, helping public to overlook the costs. The gap between perceived expected costs 
and benefits was further tipped in favour of the latter by politicians’ attempts to portray the 
war as a move to pre-empty future aggression and terrorist attacks against the Western 
homelands and interests. Nonetheless, perceived benefits were soon readjusted in response 
to evaporation of the main reason for the war, WMD. Consequently, the campaign became 
more of a humanitarian venture and less of an endeavour to defend coalition countries’ 
interests. When the costs started mounting and the vision of success became diluted by 
escalating insurgency, public opposition started rising. This tendency may have been 
reinforced by episodes of soldier misconduct, for instance in Abu Ghraib, which on one 
hand contributed to the cost side of equation by compromising the Western values and 
increasing the risk of retaliatory attacks, and on the other may have made the public 
question the gains of freedom and democracy that Iraqis were supposed to enjoy. Overall, 
the benefit side have been depreciating throughout the entire military campaign because the 
citizenry of the supporting states have been seeing a growing divergence between the war 
and their national interests.  
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Third, the citizenry in the coalition countries could feel less limited in joining war 
opposition than their American counterparts because of a wider range of alternatives. A 
withdrawal of a coalition member would not mean that the war was lost or that Iraq would 
immerse in even greater violence. Most likely, the United States would keep the situation 
under control. If not, a failure could still be largely blamed on the United States. A penalty 
for the “defector” would be limited mostly to strained relations with America and 
uncertainty of future defence alliances, which at the time may have been difficult to assess, 
and consequently seem a low price to pay for bringing troops home. A withdrawal of the 
coalition leader would be associated with very different and much graver consequences, 
including destabilization of Iraq and a loss of the superpower’s credibility. Additionally, 
America’s premature exit from Iraq would energize Islamist militants, who would see it as 
a victory even greater than the expulsion of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. This 
highlights the distinction between choices facing the public in the United States and in 
other coalition countries. 
Finally, the results may support the “Iraq syndrome”, a concept promoted by 
Mueller (2005). The controversies surrounding the campaign and its high death toll have 
made the public more suspicious and less supportive for similar ventures.  This was 
reflected in rapidly escalating war opposition across the MNF countries, including the 
United States, where support for the Iraq war declined faster than for the Vietnam and 
Korean wars (Mueller 2005). The main contributor to the public mistrust was the failure to 
find WMD. However, scandals of soldier misconduct, such as Abu Ghraib, also must have 
played their role. The three coalition countries had their share of damaging allegations too. 
Public trust in Britain was dented by accusations against Prime Minister Tony Blair of 
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deliberately misleading the public on the evidence of Iraq’s possession of WMD. The 
Australian public was outraged with the news that the reason for which the country joined 
the war was to protect its lucrative wheat trade. The Polish government was trapped in 
allegations of housing secret CIA prisons, where suspected terrorists had been tortured. 
Thus, the war and associated events have been likely to make the public question not only 
whether they can trust the United States, but also whether they can believe their own 
governments. Consequently, this will make convincing the citizenry to deploy troops 
abroad more difficult and hinder involvement in future military interventions. 
2.9. Summary 
This study uses the opinion polls from the United Kingdom, Poland and Australia to 
analyze fatality sensitivity of public opinion in coalition countries that participate in war 
efforts but are not a leading force. It introduces a notion that the relationship between war 
opposition and war fatalities has a dynamic character and therefore is best represented in 
the form of an error correction model, which solves problems of data nonstationarity and 
allows for shocks to have a long lasting impact. Nevertheless, uneven spacing of the poll 
data makes it impossible to make a sound judgment on the dynamic nature of the series. In 
fact, some of the estimates seem to suggest a static model. Overall, the data does not 
provide conclusive evidence on soldier casualty sensitivity, which I manage to establish to 
some extent only for the British series. However, there is evidence that the public in the 
coalition countries is sensitive to deaths in terrorist attacks in Iraq, which highlights the 
urgency of devising war strategies that tackle this form of violence in a more effective way. 
Intensity of terrorism may be considered as a measure of success of the war efforts as well 
as a contributor to the war costs. Therefore, public responsiveness here implies that the 
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opinion is formed through a cost-benefit analysis. Although such a framework is not ideal 
to explain the evolution of public opinion, it is flexible enough to capture the underlying 
process and is consistent with my results. The expected benefits were never high as the war 
participation was a policy choice, not a necessity to defend homeland. The distant enemy 
that did not appear obviously dangerous meant that the public placed smaller value on the 
stakes in Iraq. This may have translated into higher sensitivity to human losses evoked by 
the unexpectedly long and costly conflict. The very different nature of political and military 
involvement of the coalition countries was linked to their responsibility and risks being 
lesser than those of the coalition leader. Thus, their pull-out from the combat mission 
would have been unlikely to impair the overall war outcome and as such gave those 
countries more flexibility in forming their exit strategies. This could have been reflected in 
the war-time opinion. A lower cost of a potential withdrawal could have given the public 
more choice and made it easier to join the war opposition. 
The study confirms the validity of using logged cumulative fatalities as an 
explanatory variable in war-time opinion models. Most of the time, news services reported 
the number of soldier deaths as a cumulative value since the beginning of the combat 
operations. Additionally, the opposition exhibited an upward tendency, which was captured 
rather well by the monotonic nature of cumulative fatalities. The reversal of the increase in 
opposition was almost impossible because the reasons for the intervention had been proven 
nonexistent and the coalition soon became implicated in numerous errors and scandals, 
contributing to an impression that it was a “dirty” war. 
The error correction specification seems to indicate that the public does not base 
their opinion only on the most recent changes in the fatality series, but is likely to take into 
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account developments in earlier periods too. Moreover, there may be a tendency to over-
weigh new information, which means that reports of a surge in fatalities, soldier 
misconduct or wrongdoing are particularly damaging in short run.  An overreaction should 
be gradually corrected in subsequent periods and a long-run equilibrium should be 
eventually reinstated. The fact that the public may employ a long-term perspective when 
forming opinion has implications for policymakers. First, together with the cost-benefit 
analysis it confirms public’s rational approach to the war. Second, governments should 
avoid taking offhand and populist decisions under pressure of a moment and rather wait for 
the opposition to re-equilibrate. Third, they should make an effort to keep a number of war-
related lapses and backslidings at minimum, because as the example of Abu Ghraib shows, 
they are costly in terms of war opposition. However, once an oversight happens, 
policymakers should try to convince the public that it was a one-off accident, for example 
through an appropriate investigation into causes, improved checks, guidelines, etc. A 
failure to do so is likely to deepen the damage in the war support because the adverse effect 
would die out more slowly than if the public was convinced that a future risk of such events 
was small. Fourth, possible long public memory may have led to the development of the 
Iraq syndrome, which is likely to hinder future military interventions, as public will be 
more suspicious of evidence and arguments presented by policymakers in support for 
committing a country to war. 
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The error correction parameter should be interpreted with caution due to uneven data spacing.  
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0.49 0.53 0.09 0.02 0.80 
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*
p ≤ .05, 
**
p ≤ .01. One-tailed tests. 
†
 
significant heteroskedasticity. 
 
Table 2.1.  ECM estimates based on logged cumulative fatalities 
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Table 2.2. Long-run multipliers for the log model 
  Model United Kingdom Poland 
National fatalities 1 10.74
**
 - 
 
(2.02)  
All MNF fatalities 2 6.20
**
 7.57
**
 
 
(0.81) (1.60) 
Terrorism 
3 
1.46
**
 3.34
**
 
 
(0.43) (0.95) 
Note: Standard errors computed using Bewley (1979) transformation in 
parentheses. 
*
p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01. One-tailed tests. 
  
  
  
 
8
9
 to uneven data spacing.  
. The error correction parameter should be interpreted with caution due  
 
United Kingdom 
 
Poland  Australia 
 
1 2 3 
 
4 5 6  7 
Oppositiont-1 -0.59
**
 -0.55
**
 -0.82
**
 
 
-0.86
**
 -0.93
**
 -1.12
**
  -0.96
*
 
 
(0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.18) (0.17) (0.16)  (0.29) 
Δ Mrg National fatalitiest -0.03 
   
-0.41 
  
  
 
(0.16) (0.77)   
Mrg National fatalitiest-1 -0.10 
   
-0.39 
  
  
 
(0.09) (0.48)   
Δ Mrg All MNF fatalitiest 
 
0.02 
   
0.00 
 
  
 
(0.02) (0.02)   
Mrg All MNF fatalitiest-1 
 
-0.01 
   
0.03 
 
  
 
(0.02) (0.02)   
Δ Mrg Terrorismt 
  
0.004
*
 
   
-0.002  0.01 
 
(0.002) (0.004)  (0.01) 
Mrg Terrorismt-1 
  
0.003
*
 
   
0.005
**
  0.007
**
 
 
(0.001) (0.001)  (0.01) 
End of invasion 3.60 4.25 4.07
*
 
 
-11.84 -16.07
*
 -16.46
**
   
 
(1.96) (2.21) (1.57) (6.41) (6.57) (5.39)   
Capture of Saddam -3.35 -1.52 -2.11 
 
1.20 -1.51 0.20   
 
(2.48) (2.35) (1.97) (3.84) (3.75) (3.11)   
Torture / March 11 8.80
**
 8.42
**
 8.15
**
 
 
13.69
**
 11.58
**
 11.22
**
   
 
(2.62) (2.68) (2.34) (4.21) (4.07) (3.41)   
Constant 23.00
**
 19.50
**
 29.15
**
 
 
60.87
**
 63.29
**
 79.75
**
  43.56
*
 
 
(5.89) (5.07) (5.94) (14.07) (13.43) (12.65)  (13.88) 
Model diagnostics 
       
  
Adjusted R
2
 0.27 0.26 0.39 
 
0.41 0.46 0.60  0.80 
Ljung-Box Q Test 3.21 4.32 2.68 
 
2.32 2.83 3.91  2.99 
Breusch-Pagan χ2 0.47 0.00 0.04 
 
10.68
†
 5.43
†
 4.96
†
  0.14 
ARCH χ2 (1) 1.56 2.11 0.76 
 
0.93 0.79 0.27  0.01 
Skewness/Kurtosis χ2 1.04 1.26 0.82  3.29 0.37 0.25  0.90 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Models 4 and 9 use non-national fatalities instead of all fatalities. N = 39 for the UK, 31 for Poland and 10 
for Australia. *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01. 
†
 denotes present heteroskedasticity 
Table 2.3. ECM estimates based on unlogged marginal fatalities 
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The error correction parameter should be interpreted with caution due to uneven 
data spacing. 
 
Table 2.4. ECM estimates based on logged cumulative casualty series 
  United Kingdom 
  1 2 3 
Oppositiont-1 -0.78
**
 -0.96
**
 -0.97
**
 
 
(0.16) (0.15) (0.14) 
Δ Ln National casualties 11.98* 4.24 6.25 
 
(4.75) (5.99) (3.53) 
Ln National casualtiest-1 6.49
*
 -8.23 -1.49 
 
(2.54) (7.05) (2.63) 
Δ Ln All MNF fatalitiest  2.20 
 
 
 (5.06) 
Ln All MNF fatalitiest-1 
 
5.08 
 
 
(5.05) 
Δ Ln Terrorismt  1.68
*
 1.81
**
 
 
 (0.80) (0.64) 
Ln Terrorismt-1 
 
2.32
**
 2.56
**
 
 
(0.80) (0.75) 
End of invasion -0.70   
 
(2.42)   
Capture of Saddam -3.20 -7.47
**
 -6.29
**
 
 
(2.09) (2.48) (2.02) 
Torture / March 11 7.25
**
 7.76
**
 8.95
**
 
 
(2.43) (2.41) (2.08) 
First soldier killed 
   
 
   
Constant 4.07 35.92
**
 34.31** 
 
(7.48) (10.15) (9.86) 
Model diagnostics    
Adjusted R
2
 0.37 0.52 0.53 
Ljung-Box Q Test 3.96 7.99 6.81 
Breusch-Pagan χ2 0.29 3.58 1.16 
ARCH χ2 (1) 0.31 0.06 0.14 
Skewness/Kurtosis χ2 1.20 0.02 1.47 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Model 2 uses non-national fatalities instead of 
all fatalities. N = 39. 
*
p ≤ .05, 
**
p ≤ .01. One-tailed tests. 
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Figure 2.1. Opposition to the Iraq war and soldier deaths 
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Figure 2.2. Opposition to the Iraq war and MIPT fatalities 
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Chapter 3 
Armed Conflict and Terrorism as Determinants of Foreign Aid 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Foreign aid is often claimed to be targeted at promoting economic growth and social 
development, which in turn are likely to depend on peace and stability (Blomberg, Hess et 
al. 2004; Gaibulloev and Sandler 2009). The occurrence of armed conflict or terrorism may 
constitute a hindrance for economic development and, in the eyes of donors, may reduce 
potential effectiveness of foreign aid. Therefore, these two forms of political violence can 
be considered as one of the determinants of aid flows. Following this line of reasoning, this 
chapter intends to answer whether the incidence of conflict and terrorism affects allocation 
of bilateral and multilateral aid. 
There are several reasons for which aid could be diverted away from violence 
plagued countries. Conflicts are often accompanied by internal tensions that may increase 
the risk of corruption and sleaze when it comes to spending received aid. A considerable 
portion of aid seeps out to fund military ventures (Collier 2007). Violent conflict and 
terrorism destroy physical and human capital stock, and this way may directly disturb 
commercial interests of foreign donors. Such incidents limit the extent to which aid 
contributes to economic development and poverty alleviation, and therefore reduce the 
effectiveness of aid programmes. Additionally, if there are two or more competing political 
groups within a country, foreign donors may be afraid of being accused of interfering in 
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internal politics by supporting one of them, and in the end opt out from granting any help to 
a country in need. 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) show that the impact of aid on development is not the 
main determinant of aid allocation. Donors take a number of other factors into 
consideration, including strategic alliances and colonial past (Alesina and Dollar 2000). An 
example of pursuing strategic goals by donors is aiding regimes affected by terrorism. 
Here, aid may serve as reimbursement for making counter-terrorist efforts (Mandler and 
Spagat 2003; Bandyopadhyay, Sandler et al. 2010). In such a principal-agent relationship, 
the donor wants the receiving government to contain terrorism before it spreads to the 
donor’s homeland or affects its interests elsewhere. By its nature, international terrorism is 
expected to be most susceptible to this mechanism. Bandyopadhyay and Sandler (2010) 
argue that states with global interests must introduce proactive measures through 
counterterrorism-tied aid to countries where international terrorist groups reside. Indeed, 
Azam and Thelen (2008) find that increased assistance leads to reduced levels of terrorism 
originating from the receiving country. 
When estimating the effects of terrorism, it may be important to control for armed 
conflict, which includes wars and minor conflicts of either external or internal nature. 
Drakos and Gofas (2006), Campos and Gassebner (2009), and Lai (2007) show that various 
types of conflict increase terrorism, while durable and stable regimes reduce it. Terrorism 
can also be one of the tactics used in armed conflict, hence one may expect a positive 
correlation between the two phenomena. However, the literature does not reach sound 
conclusions on that matter and is far from agreement. For instance, Li (2005) shows quite a 
different relationship and concludes that armed conflicts reduce terrorism. Also Blomberg, 
 95 
 
Hess et al. (2004) argue that terrorism and conflict are fundamentally different. Overall, 
using the two types of violence as explanatory variables may offer some useful insights into 
the aid allocation process, as well as reduces the risk of having omitted variable bias in the 
econometric model. 
The study distinguishes between bilateral and multilateral aid because the two types 
are expected to react differently to various factors. Multilateral aid should be more 
responsive to the quality of policies and government in the receiving countries and promote 
military expenditure reductions (Boyce and Pastor 1998). This is because inter-
governmental institutions should not be influenced by commercial interests, strategic 
alliances, and geopolitical or historical considerations. At the same time, bilateral donors 
are likely to be driven by these motives (Alesina and Weder 2002), along with using aid as 
a tool in combating terrorism. A part of the empirical exercise tries to answer whether 
assistance to the poorest countries and oil exporters is affected by conflict and terrorism in 
a different way than aid to their relatively richer and non-oil-exporting counterparts. It is 
important to control for the Low Income Countries (LICs) because they have typically 
weaker governments and may be less reliable partners in combating terrorism. Piazza 
(2008) finds evidence that relatively more terrorism originates from this group. On the 
other hand, oil exporters may experience different treatment by donors because their 
stability is important for the world economy (Kilian 2006; Yergin 2006). 
The empirical strategy is based on the two-way panel data estimation. The compiled 
dataset consists of an unbalanced yearly panel with observations for 161 recipient countries 
over years from 1973 to 2007. Including  individual effects offers a remedy to 
heterogeneity among recipients (Frees 2004), while time effects reflect the fact that aid 
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decisions are being made each year as well as the potential coding variations in terrorism 
datasets. In addition, the explanatory variables are lagged by one year to ensure their 
predeterminedness. An additional benefit of this is that it should reflect the aid allocation 
dynamics, where donors decide the amount of aid during the budget planning procedure. 
The data is drawn from several sources. The figures on foreign aid are taken from 
the Project-Level Aid 1.9.1, PLAID (Nielson, Powers et al. 2010), while the data on 
population and macroeconomic variables is drawn from the Penn World Table Version 6.3 
(Heston, Summers et al. 2009). I also include an index of civil liberties compiled by the 
Freedom House (2010). The conflict information is taken from the UCDP/PRIO Armed 
Conflict Dataset Version 4-2009 (Gleditsch, Wallensteen et al. 2002). Two independent 
measures of terrorism are introduced. ITERATE (Mickolus, Sandler et al. 2008) measures 
only international terrorism, while the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (START 2011) is 
dominated by domestic terrorism (Kis-Katos, Liebert et al. 2011). 
The results on socio-economic variables are similar to those in the existing 
literature. More populous countries tend to get shares of foreign aid lower than suggested 
by their population size. Foreign aid is increasing in income but at a decreasing rate. Thus, 
donors tend to favour poor countries with an exception of a number of the poorest states, 
which are likely to have limited ability to use received aid efficiently. Notably, the 
relationship between multilateral aid to oil exporters and their income is strongly negative, 
while bilateral donors’ decisions are driven mostly by the volume of oil exports. Finally, 
trade openness increases both multilateral and bilateral aid. 
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Armed conflict reduces bilateral and multilateral aid by nearly 40 and 80 per cent, 
respectively. However, bilateral donors appear ready to turn a blind eye on conflict and 
terrorism in oil exporting countries. The latter form of violence causes different reactions 
among bilateral and multilateral donors. Countries with a high level of international 
terrorism may hope for a proportionally higher raise in bilateral aid when faced with 
additional attacks than their peaceful counterparts. This is consistent with the principal-
agent framework in which aid constitutes reimbursement for recipient’s efforts against 
terrorists (Mandler and Spagat 2003; Bandyopadhyay, Sandler et al. 2010). However, 
bilateral donors are less sensitive to domestic terrorism, which does not affect their interests 
directly. Multilateral aid does not show any reaction to international terrorism, but seems to 
react somewhat adversely to its domestic variant. Overall, the results seem to agree with the 
notion that multilateral donors are more committed to poverty reduction and aid efficiency. 
Unlike bilateral donors, they do not need to provide security for their citizens, and therefore 
they do not have additional incentives in assisting violence ridden states. In fact, they may 
be conflict averse due to the potential losses in aid effectiveness. On the other hand, they 
still may be under influence of governments that constitute them, which could help to 
explain their lack of reaction to international terrorism. 
The following section presents a brief literature review. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 
describe the data sources and basic statistics. The empirical strategy and results are 
discussed in Sections 3.5 and 3.6, respectively. Finally, Section 3.7 offers concluding 
remarks. 
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3.2. Literature review 
The economic and political literature is abundant with studies of determinants of foreign 
aid distribution and its effects on socio-economic development. This study belongs to the 
branch which deals with the impact that instability in receiving states has on aid flows. 
Chauvet (2003) summarizes four criteria for aid allocation: recipient’s needs and merit, 
vulnerability to shocks, and donor’s interests. She defines socio-political instability as a 
propensity for a change in executive power, and analyzes its influence on allocation of 
bilateral and multilateral aid. She finds that violent instability (coups, civil wars, guerrilla 
warfare, riots and strikes) has a positive impact on aid allocation, but also suggests that this 
is an “inverted U” relationship, where low levels of instability may result in increased aid 
flows as donors attempt to safeguard their interests. But when instability increases, the 
threat to donors’ commercial and strategic interests may persuade them to shift their 
attention, and consequently money, to more stable countries. Thus, from a donor’s point of 
view, instability may affect the needs of recipients, but at the same time it may be a merit 
variable through which donors may wish to reward more stable states. Chauvet (2003) also 
notes that LICs receive less aid than other countries when faced with violent instability.  
In their oft cited study, Alesina and Dollar (2000) establish some determinants of 
bilateral aid and analyze behaviour of selected donor countries. They conclude that colonial 
history and strategic alliances are the main determinants of the amount of aid received. 
Hence, bilateral donors are likely to promote their strategic political interests over poverty 
reduction, promotion of openness, democracy and good policies. A paper by Alesina and 
Weder (2002) largely confirms these findings, but in addition studies the impact of 
corruption among recipients on aid allocation. In general they do not find any evidence of a 
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negative relationship between received aid and corruption. However, they note that donors 
differ in their behaviour. For instance, the Scandinavian countries and Australia tend to 
give more to less corrupt governments, while the United States favours democracies and 
does not seem to be preoccupied by the quality of government. 
Game theoretic models linking aid to terrorism have been developed in Mandler and 
Spagat (2003), and Bandyopadhay and Sandler (2010). The two models allow aid to be 
conditioned on undertaking certain counterterrorism efforts by the receiving government, 
and both of them warn that in some circumstances foreign aid may worsen the terrorist 
threat. Bandyopadhay and Sandler (2010) note that recipient’s efforts demonstrate 
substitutability with donor’s counterterrorism measures as they are intended to thwart 
international terrorism at its origin. Nonetheless, terrorism-tied aid may result in protests 
and internal unrest in the receiving country. If the regime becomes sufficiently weakened, 
its ability to fight terrorists may become limited, and the threat to both the donor and 
recipient may rise. Azam and Delacroix (2006) and Azam and Thelen (2008) empirically 
test such a principal-agent framework by estimating an attack supply curve. They find that 
increased aid results in reduced levels of terrorism originating from the receiving country. 
In addition, the latter study shows that recipient country’s level of education also reduces 
supply of terrorist attacks. Although their models do not allow for the possibility of a 
reverse relationship, i.e. that terrorism determines the aid levels, the authors conclude that 
donors are giving more aid to countries with higher risks of producing terrorism. In both 
papers the authors use terrorism as a dependent variable, while aid is one of the regressors. 
I take a different approach hypothesizing the causal relationship to run in the opposite 
direction: from terrorism to foreign aid.  
 100 
 
The most common empirical approach in the literature seems to be the two-way 
panel data estimation. Trumbull and Wall (1994) set up a panel data model for foreign aid. 
They acknowledge that country-level data is likely to be plagued with heterogeneity and as 
a remedy suggest using fixed effects. Individual effects account for different weights that 
donors assign to recipients, while time effects are justified by the fact that aid decisions are 
being made each year. The former also controls for potentially omitted variables that tend 
to be persistent over time, and the latter for shocks that are temporal and affect all countries 
in a given period. Studies of determinants of foreign aid that follow a similar approach 
include Ali and Isse (2006), Alesina and Dollar (2000), Chauvet (2003), Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004), and Fleck and Kilby (2010). The two-way panel estimation is also used by 
Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides (2004), and Gaibulloev and Sandler (2008; 2009) to study 
effects of conflict and terrorism on economic growth.  
3.3. Data 
This section briefly describes data sources used in this chapter. The figures on foreign aid 
are drawn from the Project-Level Aid 1.9.1 database, PLAID 1.9.1 (Nielson, Powers et al. 
2010), made available by AidData.org. The dataset includes development finance in a form 
of either loans or grants from governments, government aid agencies, and inter-
governmental organizations (IGOs). PLAID goes beyond aid flows included in the OECD’s 
Official Development Assistance (ODA), and incorporates international loans at market 
rates as long as they constitute an effort to foster economic or social development. 
However, it does not include funding that originates from non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), contributions from private sector investors, banks, or foundations. A large portion 
of over one million records in PLAID is drawn from the online and CD-ROM versions of 
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the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS)1, which is then complemented with annual 
reports, project documents and web-based data collected directly from donors. PLAID 
reports two types, or stages, of aid flows: commitments, which are the amount of money 
that a donor has allocated to an aid project, and disbursements, which are the amount of 
money that has been actually spend on the activity. Although disbursements provide a more 
accurate picture of real aid flows, the information is available only for 48.6 per cent of 
records (Nielson, Powers et al. 2010). Therefore, I use the commitments (available 99.16 
per cent of the time), which are likely to reflect the donors’ perception of recipients’ needs 
and circumstances fairly well, as well as to be an acceptable proxy for the funds actually 
donated. Before carrying on with the analysis, I drop the records presenting aid flows to 
multilateral organizations, where a receiving country cannot be uniquely identified.  
 The dependent variable in this chapter is aid per capita, which is generated by 
dividing the commitment figures in constant 2000 dollars by population in respective 
countries. The data on population, along with two macroeconomic variables is drawn from 
the Penn World Table Version 6.3 (Heston, Summers et al. 2009), which is commonly used 
in the literature and does not require detailed introduction. The macroeconomic variables 
are the real GDP per capita in constant dollars, and a measure of country openness, which is 
the total trade (exports plus imports) as a per centage of GDP in constant dollars. The latter 
may serve as an indicator of good economic policies, but also may be a variable of interest 
                                                 
1
 Although the online version of CRS is expected to be more up to date and detailed, it does not include 
information for a number of recipient countries, e.g. Bulgaria, Lebanon and Russia, and donors, e.g. World 
Trade Organization and Food and Agriculture Organizations. PLAID derives this information from the CD-
ROM version of CRS. For details see the PLAID 1.9.1 Codebook and User’s Guide available at 
http://www.aiddata.org/help/guide. 
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to donors. Aid helps to finance trade deficits of developing nations and thus is boosting 
their imports from rich countries.  
 A part of the empirical exercise tries to answer whether aid flows to the poorest 
countries and the oil exporters are affected by conflict and terrorism in a different way than 
those to the relatively richer and non-oil-exporting states. In order to distinguish between 
these groups, I employ the World Development Indicators, made available by the World 
Bank (1978-2008). Based on their gross national income (GNI) per capita, states are 
divided into three categories: low, medium and high income countries – LICs, MICs and 
HICs, respectively. I explicitly distinguish LICs as the poorest recipients in the following 
discussion. The “richer countries” group consists of MICs and those of them that had 
managed to advance to the HIC group during the sample period, for instance Portugal, 
Czech Republic and Bahrain. The sample of oil exporters includes states whose fuel exports 
as a percentage of merchandise exports average 50 per cent or more.  
 Previous studies, e.g. Alesina and Dollar (2000) and Chauvet (2003), show a 
significant relationship between received aid and recipients’ level of civil liberties and 
democracy. Therefore, I use the civil liberties index developed by the Freedom House 
(2010), which grades states on a scale from one to seven, with one representing the highest 
degree of freedom and seven the lowest
2
.  
To address the core question of this study, I introduce three independent measures 
of political violence. I take two alternative terrorism datasets, ITERATE (Mickolus, 
                                                 
2
 I also considered the Freedom House’s political rights index, but decided to present results based only 
on the measure of civil liberties. The two indices are highly correlated, with the correlation coefficients of 0.9, 
and give very similar results.  
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Sandler et al. 2008) and the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (START 2011), and divide 
their annual totals for each country by population to construct two alternative measures of 
terrorism. I normalize the level of terrorism by the recipient’s population because ten 
attacks in a country of 100 million should have a smaller economic impact than the same 
number of attacks in a country of five million. Since ITERATE includes only international 
events, and GTD includes international and domestic attacks, using these two alternative 
measures should help to distinguish, at least to some extent, between the effects of the two 
types of terrorism on aid. Between 1973 and 2007, ITERATE and GTD recorded 11,506 
and 78,762 attacks, respectively
3
. Assuming that both datasets track international incidents 
in an adequate and comparable manner, an overwhelming majority of attacks in GTD is 
expected to be domestic. Indeed, Kis-Katos and Liebert et al. (2011) estimate that only 
around 14 per cent of incidents included in GTD constitute international terrorism. It should 
be stressed that it is unfeasible to separate domestic events by deducting ITERATE’s 
records from those of GTD, because the two datasets are likely to rely on different sources 
and judgment calls. A similar strategy has been applied by Gaibulloev and Sandler (2008) 
in their study of the impact of terrorism on economic growth in Asia. 
Finally, I draw the data on armed conflict from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict 
Dataset Version 4-2009, which lists situations “where the use of armed force between two 
parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related 
deaths” (Gleditsch, Wallensteen et al. 2002). This includes wars and minor conflicts of 
either external or internal nature. Based on this dataset, I generate an indicator variable 
                                                 
3
 The GTD dataset is missing the records for 1993, which were lost during moving the early paper version of 
the database from one location to another. This is reflected in a lower number of observations used in the 
following GTD regressions. 
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which takes a value of one if a country experienced a conflict in a given year, or zero 
otherwise. 
 Bringing the above variables together yields an unbalanced panel dataset for 161 
recipient countries covering years from 1973 to 2007. The choice of 1973 as the initial year 
is dictated by the fact that prior to this date, the information included in PLAID and the 
terrorist datasets is rather spotty and less reliable. The following section discusses basic 
statistical properties of the data with a distinction between bilateral and multilateral aid 
flows. 
3.4. Summary statistics 
This section begins with a presentation of basic summary statistics for terrorism and 
conflict, and then moves to a review of correlation coefficients between the variables used 
in this study.  The three panels of Table 3.1 display summary statistics by recipient type 
for ITERATE, GTD and the conflict data, respectively. The last three columns show a 
breakdown of the variation attributable to individual, time and random effects. The top 
panel describes international terrorism recorded by ITERATE. There are 0.29 attacks per 
million persons in an average recipient-year, with the poorest countries considerably less 
plagued by this type of violence. Large dispersion in the data suggests that some recipient-
year observations are characterized by more than one attack. When looking at the variance 
decomposition, the random effects seem to be a driving factor. The individual effects 
account for around 30 per cent of the variance, while the time effects cause very little 
variation. 
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 GTD, which records domestic and international terrorism, has a mean of 1.3 
incidents per million persons in a typical recipient-year observation. As before, terrorism 
seems to be less frequent in the LIC and oil exporting countries. Since GTD contains a 
broader scope of terrorist events, the differences between its means and those of ITERATE 
are indicative of a much higher frequency of domestic terrorism. However, as explained 
before, one must be cautious when drawing such conclusions. Again, the data variance is 
driven mostly by the random component, while the time effects seem to be least influential. 
 The bottom panel reports the statistics on armed conflict, which is an indicator 
variable. It occurs in nearly one out of five recipient-years. It is more frequent in the oil 
exporting countries, and almost twice more likely in LICs than in other states. Interestingly, 
armed conflict seems more common among the poorest recipients, while terrorism tends to 
be more frequent in the non-LIC sample. This implies that the two do not capture the same 
patterns of violent instability, and therefore it is reasonable to analyze their effects 
separately. The individual and random components appear to be equally important: each of 
them accounts for around 50 per cent of the variance decomposition. The variance fractions 
in Table 3.1 underline the importance of controlling for the fixed effects when estimating 
the influence of armed conflict and terrorism on foreign aid allocation. 
 The correlations between foreign aid and the explanatory variables are shown in 
Table 3.2. In the all recipients sample, civil liberties and openness exhibit the strongest 
relationship with foreign assistance. However, their correlations go in opposite directions: 
less free countries, those with a higher Freedom House index, receive less aid per capita, 
while those with a higher ratio of international trade to GDP enjoy higher aid flows. Thus, 
democracy and economic openness are accompanied by larger aid receipts. Interestingly, 
 106 
 
the low correlation of aid and income per capita suggests that donors may promote other 
aims than poverty reduction. A similar conclusion has been reached in Burnside and Dollar 
(2000). Not surprisingly, more open economies tend to have a higher GDP per capita.  
Foreign aid shows little correlation with terrorism. However, the coefficient signs 
suggest that bilateral donors may remain undiscouraged by increased incidence of 
terrorism, while their multilateral counterparts are more likely to be terrorism-averse. This 
claim undergoes a more formal investigation in Section 3.6. Interestingly, the incidence of 
international terrorism appears to be increasing as recipient’s income raises and civil 
liberties become more advanced (in line with Tavares 2004). Armed conflicts show a 
negative relationship with foreign aid. Notably, the correlation of conflict with multilateral 
aid is much stronger than with bilateral aid, -0.17 and -0.07, respectively. Conflicts seem 
more common in more populated countries, but less frequent in richer, more open and freer 
societies. International terrorism measured by ITERATE exhibits positive but small 
correlation with armed conflict (0.06), while GTD’s relationship seems considerably 
stronger (0.21). 
 Panel 2 of Table 3.2 examines the LIC sample. The correlation of bilateral and 
multilateral aid is higher in the poorest countries than in the overall sample, 0.48 and 0.14, 
respectively. Thus, LICs may be more likely than their richer counterparts to receive 
simultaneous aid from both sources. There is also a stronger positive association of aid with 
income, economic openness and civil liberties. The relationship of aid and GTD is much 
stronger among LICs, while that with ITERATE is still negligible. The negative association 
of aid and the armed conflict variable is also stronger in LICs. Interestingly, the relationship 
between civil liberties and international terrorism is very different from that in other 
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countries. Here, the positive and somewhat higher correlation coefficient (0.124) suggests 
that there are more international attacks in less free societies.  
 Finally, Panel 3 provides correlation coefficients for oil exporters. Aid inflows 
appear to be weakly related to economic openness. However, this can be due to the smaller 
variation across recipient-years, which is expected since all these states are actively 
engaged in the international oil markets. Income per capita is positively but weakly 
correlated with bilateral aid. The correlation with multilateral aid is somewhat stronger and 
negative. Both types of aid are negatively correlated with the Freedom House index. Thus, 
a greater degree of freedom appears to be associated with more aid. However, this 
correlation is somewhat stronger for multilateral (-0.27) than bilateral aid (-0.03). Judging 
by the correlation coefficients, oil exporters may be less penalized for political violence. 
The relationship between aid and GTD is positive and relatively strong. As before, armed 
conflict is negatively associated with both types of aid, but here this relationship is 
relatively weak. These claims are pursued in Section 3.6. 
To summarize, conflict appears to be positively correlated with terrorism, with an 
exception in the oil exporter sample. Thus, it is important to control for both types of 
violence in order to avoid omitted variable bias. Several more regularities can be suggested 
by Table 3.1 and Table 3.2. For instance, multilateral donors may be more likely to stick to 
the goal of poverty reduction and divert their resources away from richer oil exporters. In 
case of the LIC sample, the positive correlation of aid and GDP may be associated with an 
ability to use aid more effectively by relatively richer LICs, which may have stronger 
governments, better quality of policies and infrastructure. At the same time, multilateral 
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organizations are less likely to follow geopolitical strategic interests and therefore may 
show more adversity to conflict (see Boyce and Pastor 1998; Alesina and Weder 2002). 
3.5. Empirical approach 
The empirical analysis is based on OLS two-way panel data regressions. Similar approach 
in assessing determinants of foreign aid is used by Chauvet (2003), Trumbull and Wall 
(1994), Alesina and Dollar (2000), Alesina and Weder (2002). Gaibulloev and Sandler 
(2008) and Blomberg et al. (2004) also use two-way panel data estimation to analyze the 
impact of terrorism and conflict on economic growth. The choice of explanatory variables 
on socio-economic conditions such as income, economic openness and level of democracy 
is motivated largely by the findings of earlier studies, in particular Alesina and Dollar 
(2000), Alesina and Weder (2002), and Chauvet (2003). The estimated model has the 
following form: 
                                                      
                
                    
                                        
  
                                                  
                                    
                               
where AID is aid per capita received by a recipient i in year t, GDP is measured per capita 
in constant dollars, and OPENNESS is the sum of recipient’s exports and imports as a share 
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of GDP. The number of terrorist incidents per capita in a receiving country recorded either 
by ITERATE or GTD is denoted by ATTACKS, while CONFLICT is an indicator variable 
taking a value of 1 in a presence of armed conflict in country i and period t. The Low 
Income Countries are singled out by a binary variable LIC. The inclusion of the interaction 
terms LIC with the intensity of terrorism and conflict allows to test whether donors give 
different treatment to the poorest states affected by violence. The CIVLIB variable 
measures the level of democracy based on the Freedom House’s Civil Liberties Index. 
RECIPIENTi and YEARt are the recipient-specific and year-specific effects, respectively. 
Eventually, εi,t stands for the error term. It needs to be emphasized that this is a reduced 
form model, and therefore it should not be interpreted purely in either demand or supply 
terms.  
The two-way panel data estimation is not free from disadvantages. One of them is 
potential heterogeneity caused by unobserved effects that may be correlated with observed 
regressors. As a remedy, Frees (2004) suggests fixed effects estimation. Therefore, I control 
for recipient-specific fixed effects, which are likely to arise because donors assign different 
weights to recipients based on characteristics which remain constant over time, for instance 
colonial ties, geographical location, landmass or strategic alliances (Trumbull and Wall 
1994). In addition, the model allows for time effects, which may arise because aid 
allocation decisions are typically made every year. This should, at least partially, alleviate 
the worries caused by global economic cycles. An additional benefit of controlling for time 
effects is that they account for possible changes in coding practices of ITERATE and GTD. 
Since these databases rely on individual decisions made by their staff and are based on 
various open sources, such changes are likely to emerge. The downside of individual fixed 
 110 
 
effects is that they are not reliable in estimating observed but time invariant variables. For 
this reason, I do not include the colonial history in my model. Besides, it is not a variable of 
interest in this study and has been paid considerable attention in Alesina and Dollar (2000).  
 Another worry related to panel data estimation is potential endogeneity. The causal 
link between aid and political violence is not necessarily one-directional. One cannot rule 
out beneficial influence of foreign aid on stabilizing societies or inducing recipient 
governments to take more effective counterterrorism measures. Accordingly, through 
accelerated reforms aid can help governments to satisfy needs of dissident interest groups; 
through a positive impact on economic growth it may increase the opportunity cost of 
joining rebel or terrorist organizations; and through increased military and security 
expenditures it can make a successful atrocities less likely (Collier and Hoeffler 2000). On 
the other hand, aid may lead to increased violence by raising potential gains to rebels from 
taking over the government and having access to aid contracts. As Bandyopadhyay and 
Sandler (2010) argue, terrorism-tied aid can make the receiving government appear as 
serving foreign interests, and consequently lead to social unrest and destabilization. The 
result may be even more political violence. Similarly, a potentially two-directional 
relationship between aid and income or trade may also create endogeneity bias.  
To mitigate this problem, the foreign aid allocations are estimated using explanatory 
variables lagged by one year. It is difficult to see how foreign aid in a current year, t, could 
affect the volume of terrorist attacks and incidence of armed conflict (or other regressors) in 
earlier years, t – p, where p = 1, 2, 3, .... Note that it seems plausible that aid may affect 
terrorism in the concurrent period because dissidents may be capable of launching almost 
immediate responses to changing environment. Hence, the econometric strategy is based on 
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lagged regressors and the ensuing assumptions of predeterminedness, and sequential 
exogeneity conditional on the unobserved effects. The predeterminedness of regressors 
ensures consistency of the OLS estimates, individual dummy terms remove unobserved 
fixed effects that could cause endogeneity, and lagged explanatory variables serve as 
sequentially exogenous instruments to estimate the model (Frees 2004). An additional 
benefit of using one-year lag is that it reflects the aid allocation dynamics. Decisions on 
granting aid are unlikely to be made in real time as events unfold.  Decision makers are 
expected to base their opinion on historical data. Also, the amount of money a donor can 
dedicate to foreign aid is typically decided during the budget planning procedure, which 
takes place in advance. Consequently, a breakout of a conflict or increased terrorist activity 
in a current period is not expected to significantly affect current aid flows, which have been 
designated in donors’ budgets. However, those events are likely to be taken into 
consideration when allocating aid for the following year.  
 The literature is split when it comes to using either yearly panel or averaging 
observations over longer periods, typically four or five years. Alesina and Dollar (2000), 
Alesina and Weder (2002), and Chauvet (2003) argue that working on longer periods has a 
beneficial effect of accounting for business cycle. Other researchers, such as Fleck and 
Kilby (2010), Blomberg et al. (2004), Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009) work on yearly 
panels, and this is the approach that I pursue. Averaging observations over longer periods 
could blur effects of conflict or terrorism. An outbreak of violence in one year could result 
in a reduction in received aid; however, if a conflict was mitigated within a year or two, a 
country could consequently experience higher aid flows designated for reconstruction and 
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as an incentive for maintaining stability. This process would be indistinguishable when 
using five-year periods. 
 Finally, I also control for the “Egypt and Israel bias” (Alesina and Weder 2002; 
Azam and Delacroix 2006). The two countries receive a disproportionally large share of 
foreign aid (particularly from the United States). Both of them play a key role in 
maintaining stability in the Middle East, and have a history of terrorism and armed conflict. 
For similar reasons I control for Pakistan, whose support is deemed crucial for the War on 
Terror (Fleck and Kilby 2010). A collapse of those regimes and/or escalation of violence in 
these three countries almost certainly would affect the Western donors and their interests. 
3.6. Results 
This section discusses empirical results obtained through an estimation of the aid allocation 
function. I begin with a discussion of determinants of bilateral aid, then move to 
multilateral aid, and eventually address the aid flows to the oil exporting countries.  
Bilateral aid  
Table 3.3 presents estimates of the effects of terrorism and armed conflict on bilateral aid. 
Regressions in columns 1 and 3 do not distinguish the income class of the receiving state. 
Columns 2 and 4 introduce a dummy variable for the Low Income Countries, LIC, and its 
interactions with terrorism and conflict variables. This leads to a lower number of 
observations because I drop states which are not included in the World Bank’s income 
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classification
4
. R-squared above 0.6 suggests that the models explain the aid allocation 
fairly well. Behaviour of the coefficients on population, income, openness and civil 
liberties is in accord with the existing literature, and does not vary considerably across the 
models. Specifically, larger countries tend to get shares of foreign aid lower than their 
population suggests (although this effect appears to be marginally significant). Trumbull 
and Wall (1994) blame this “population bias” on donors’ preference to spend limited 
resources where the impact of one dollar will be the greatest per person. GDP per capita 
enters the regression twice: in a linear and quadratic form. The positive linear coefficient 
suggests that bilateral aid is increasing in income, while the negative quadratic coefficient 
indicates that this is happening at a decreasing rate. The turning point between 1,496 and 
1,687 dollars per capita reassures that donors tend to favour poor countries with an 
exception of a number of the poorest states, which are likely to have very limited ability to 
use received aid efficiently (Chauvet 2003). This is further confirmed by the highly 
significant and negative coefficients on the LIC indicator variable. Thus, countries, which 
in 2006 had GDP per capita lower than 906 US dollars, received nearly 30 per cent less aid 
per capita than their richer counterparts, ceteris paribus. The openness coefficient shows 
that one per cent increase in recipient’s international trade to GDP ratio increases bilateral 
aid by 0.17 to 0.28 per cent, ceteris paribus. Thus, in this aspect donors seem to be 
rewarding good economic policies. Similarly, they reward freer countries. A negative civil 
                                                 
4
 Table 3.7 presents the coefficients of the baseline models (not distinguishing LICs) re-estimated for the 
sample of recipients included in the World Bank’s classification. The estimates are largely similar to those in 
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 The only exception is a positive and significant coefficient on the bilateral donors’ 
reactions to domestic terrorism (Column 2), which suggests that the principal-agent mechanism may also 
work for countries affected by domestic terrorism.  
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liberties coefficient indicates that a one unit move on the one-to-seven scale towards less 
freedom is associated with a reduction in received aid by 10 to 15 per cent.  
 It appears that terrorism and conflict have an opposing impact on allocation of 
bilateral aid. Starting from model 1, countries plagued by international terrorism can count 
on increased assistance. I also control for the rate of change by including terrorism in a 
quadratic form. A positive coefficient on squared log of international attacks per capita 
indicates that this rate is increasing. Thus, countries with a high level of international 
terrorism may hope for a proportionally higher raise in bilateral aid when faced with 
additional attacks than their safer counterparts. The coefficients in model 2 are even higher 
and confirm that donors are willing to assist countries plagued by international terrorism. 
The interaction term of LIC and international terrorism suggests that the poorest countries 
are not treated in any different way when faced with this form of political violence. The 
emerging picture is consistent with the principal-agent framework in which aid constitutes 
reimbursement for recipient’s efforts against terrorists (Mandler and Spagat 2003; 
Bandyopadhyay, Sandler et al. 2010). As donor’s defensive counterterrorism measures 
increase security at home, they may induce terrorists to seek softer targets in other 
countries, making the donor’s assets abroad more vulnerable. Thus, to protect political and 
economic interests, a donor may try to convince other states to exert counterterrorism 
efforts. A way to achieve this may be through conditional aid. Unfortunately, an accurate 
test of this hypothesis seems impossible, because the amount of aid conditioned on fighting 
terrorism cannot be established. However, even aid that is not explicitly tied to 
counterterrorism can bring desired effects. Namely, donors may hope to contribute to the 
eradication of terrorist-breeding grounds. By improving the economy and population’s 
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living conditions, foreign aid may increase opportunity costs of joining terrorist 
organization enough to reduce the frequency of incidents. A similar reasoning is found in 
Blomberg et al. (2004) and Bueno de Mesquita (2005), which relate terrorism to economic 
downturns and a lack of economic opportunities. 
 The estimates in models 3 and 4 suggest that bilateral donors seem less sensitive to 
domestic terrorism. This probably could be attributed to the fact that, by its definition, 
domestic terrorism does not directly affect interests of foreign donors. In addition, the risk 
of attacks spreading to donors’ homelands or against their interests is expected to be much 
lower than that associated with international terrorism. Model 4 suggests that LICs are 
punished by presence of domestic terrorism with reduced assistance (consistent with 
Chauvet 2003). Possibly, one could blame this effect on the donors’ belief that LICs have 
limited capability in fighting terrorism. Another plausible explanation is that the poorest 
countries have relatively weak political and economic links with the outer world, thus 
potential donors may see less economic and strategic interests there than in more developed 
states. However, one should be cautious when drawing conclusions on domestic terrorism. 
Any global database, including GTD, is likely to be of limited reliability due to the 
presence of potentially large reporting bias. Domestic attacks may catch much less attention 
of international media, and at the same time, non-democratic regimes may find it relatively 
easy to suppress information on them. Thus, even the best efforts of data-collectors may 
give a picture that is distant from reality
5
. 
                                                 
5
 It also should be noted that it is difficult to establish how much of the difference between the two 
datasets comes from different samples of countries. Both sources claim to cover terrorist incidents worldwide, 
and thus their codebooks include all countries considered in the study. It is possible that some states may be 
on the researcher’s “radar”, but because there have been no attacks recorded in those countries, they are not 
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 Bilateral donors appear to be conflict-averse. Table 3.3 shows that armed conflict in 
a receiving country reduces bilateral aid by 36 to 42 per cent, ceteris paribus. Notably, LICs 
do not receive any less or more aid than other recipients in the presence of conflict.  A 
typically fixed location of an armed conflict and a very low risk of it spreading to donor 
countries mean that foreign donors may not feel a need to subsidize conflict resolution 
efforts. Furthermore, they may curtail aid in order to exert pressure on a local government 
to pay more attention to the needs and wants of general population and this way avert 
current or future conflicts. By cutting aid to troubled recipients and giving it to the peaceful 
ones, donors may wish to show that maintaining social peace and stability pays off. 
Reduced aid may also reflect worries over an excessive influence of military strongmen and 
government cronies, who instead of implementing good policies may seek monetary spoils, 
while the general population is fighting for survival (Mallaby 2002). Such conditions 
should lead to a reduction in aid flows because they are far from ideal for the aid to be 
efficient and have a long lasting impact on poverty. 
 Finally, the coefficients on the indicator variables for Israel and Egypt (estimates of 
the recipient-specific fixed effects) confirm the existence of the bias in favour for these two 
countries. Respectively, they receive approximately 400 and 210-250 per cent more 
bilateral aid than other countries with similar characteristics. This result receives more 
attention in Alesina and Dollar (2000), and Azam and Delacroix (2006). There is also some 
evidence that Pakistan receives disproportionately more aid (see Fleck and Kilby 2010), 
however, this evidence is somewhat weaker than that for the “Israel and Egypt bias”.  
                                                                                                                                                    
reported in the dataset. For instance, if a country experiences only domestic terrorism, it is not expected to 
appear in ITERATE’s records, and hence assigning it a value of zero in ITERATE seems justified. Excluding 
such states would purge the dataset of stable and peaceful countries, while the lack of terrorism could also be 
a factor in the aid allocation process. 
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 Multilateral aid  
As Table 3.4 shows, the effects of economic and demographic indicators on multilateral aid 
are similar to those showed in the previous section. Multilateral aid exhibits stronger 
population bias: one per cent increase in the population size reduces aid per capita by 
approximately 1.5 per cent. The coefficients on GDP per capita also indicate that aid is 
increasing in income but at a decreasing rate. However, multilateral donors do not seem to 
explicitly discriminate against LICs. They also offer greater rewards for trade openness 
than bilateral donors. This could indicate that multilateral organizations are more 
committed to poverty reduction and good policies because they are less likely to be 
influenced by strategic alliances, geopolitical factors and colonial past (Alesina and Weder 
2002).  
Multilateral aid is more averse to violence. It does not show any reaction to 
international terrorism measured by ITERATE. But an escalation of domestic terrorism is 
likely to be associated with a drop in received multilateral aid. The negative coefficient on 
the log of quadratic attacks per capita (-0.009) indicates that this relationship seems to be 
non-linear. Multilateral aid responds very strongly to armed conflict: an affected country 
should expect a cut in multilateral aid of over 80 per cent on average. LICs are not 
additionally punished for the presence of political violence. 
 The response of multilateral donors may be different for several reasons. One of 
them may be that they are less likely to heed to geopolitical interests and therefore may pay 
more attention to the efficient use of aid, as well as the promotion of economic and social 
development. Consequently, they tend to limit the assistance to the countries affected by 
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terrorism and conflict. As Blomberg, Hess et al. (2004), and Gaibulloev and Sandler (2008; 
2009) show, violent instability significantly reduces economic growth. In addition, it is 
likely to be associated with smaller investment, poor policies and higher risks of resources 
being misused. Thus, it could discourage multilateral donors by having an adverse impact 
on the effectiveness of foreign aid. These studies also show that armed conflict influences 
economic growth much more than terrorism. Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009) put the effect 
of conflict at twice the size of the impact of terrorism. This could explain why donors’ 
response to armed conflict is stronger than to international or domestic terrorism. 
Concurrently, multinational agencies may be inclined to using aid as a tool in the 
promotion of peace and stability. They may try to establish an example for recipients by 
punishing violent states and rewarding those that find peaceful solutions. This reasoning is 
in line with Boyce and Pastor (1998), who argue that international institutions encourage 
military expenditure reductions and good governance.  
 There is still a question why multilateral donors respond differently to the two types 
of terrorism. Namely, why they shun away from domestic terrorism, but do not mind its 
international variant. One obvious answer seems to be that the latter is less frequent and 
therefore less destructive, and as such poses a lesser threat to human and physical capital 
that ensures an efficient use of aid. As already mentioned, multilateral institutions are less 
likely to succumb to geopolitical considerations and, unlike bilateral donors, do not need to 
provide security for their citizens. Hence, they do not have additional incentives in assisting 
violence ridden states. In contrary, they may be conflict averse due to the potential losses in 
aid effectiveness. However, one cannot rule out that multinational institutions are still under 
some influence of governments that constitute them. As discussed in the earlier section, 
 119 
 
those governments may be not interested in providing additional assistance to recipients 
beset by domestic terrorism, but they tend to subsidize a fight against international 
terrorism. Thus, this predisposition to assist exporters of terrorism may be offset by the 
multilateral organization’s drive towards efficiency. This is not implausible as the largest 
multilateral donors are dominated by the Western countries, which are also the most 
frequent targets of international terrorists. For instance, Mallaby (2002) argues that in spite 
of being multinational in principle, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
reflect thinking and priorities of the United States – a country that is a target of 40 per cent 
of all international attacks (Enders and Sandler 2006). 
 Finally, multilateral aid does not seem to reward civil liberties. This, although 
surprising, is in line with Chauvet (2003). International institutions also do not favour 
Israel. It seems understandable because a special treatment to this well off country would 
be difficult to justify in terms of poverty reduction. Furthermore, it could be seen as too 
politically charged to pass the multilateral decision making process. Egypt and Pakistan 
still appear to receive more aid than other countries with similar characteristics. 
Unfortunately, the above analysis does not identify the reasons behind this favourable 
treatment. 
Oil exporters  
Conflict and terrorism may have different implications when taking place in oil exporting 
countries because stability of those states is a variable of interest to foreign donors. By oil 
exporting countries I understand states whose oil exports constitute at least 50 per cent of 
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all merchandise exports
6
. The estimates of determinants of aid received by this group are 
presented in Table 3.5. 
Both types of aid demonstrate strong population bias, however they respond in a 
different way to the recipients’ income per capita. Bilateral donors do not take this variable 
into account, while their multilateral counterparts react to increases in income with aid cuts. 
This result is not surprising because oil exporters belong to the richest aid recipients. Table 
3.5 introduces an additional variable representing the value of oil exports in constant 2005 
dollars (World Bank 1978-2008). As expected, multinational organizations are not 
influenced by the size of oil exports, while bilateral donors reward one per cent increase in 
oil exports with around 0.22 per cent raise in aid. Neither type of aid is dependent on civil 
liberties or trade openness. Note that the oil export variable also constitutes a measure of 
openness.  
Bilateral donors appear to be neutral to terrorism and conflict occurring in oil 
exporting countries. Thus, they do not offer additional assistance when international 
terrorism rises, as it was in the case of the general sample. This result is somewhat 
surprising because it is a common perception that oil importers are ready to provide 
assistance to ensure stability of oil producing regimes, for instance the United States offers 
far going support to Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Perhaps bilateral donors do not want to appear 
to be supporting non-democratic regimes in exchange for oil. Nonetheless, this question 
would be best addressed in a donor-by-donor analysis, which is out of the scope of this 
study.  
                                                 
6
 Countries included in the sample are: Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Brunei, Congo, Rep., 
Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, Trinidad & Tobago, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela and Yemen. 
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Multilateral donors, free of strategic alliances, are consistent in their aversion to 
conflict.  An occurrence of armed conflict reduces multilateral aid to an oil exporter by 
approximately 75 per cent. Nonetheless, there is no evidence that they react to terrorism. 
Although the coefficients are negative, only the estimate on ITERATE (model 3) is 
marginally significant. I do not include the squared measure of terrorism in Table 3.5 
because it returns statistically insignificant results in all four models.  
In summary, dealing with oil exporters, multinational organizations seem to be 
more consistent with the aim of poverty reduction and promotion of socioeconomic 
development. At the same time, bilateral donors appear to be concerned mostly with the 
volume of oil exports, and ready to turn a blind eye on ongoing conflicts and civil right 
abuses. 
3.7. Discussion 
This study intends to answer whether the occurrence of armed conflict and terrorism affects 
foreign aid flows. To that end, panel data methods are employed to estimate an aid 
allocation function separately for bilateral and multilateral assistance. The used explanatory 
variables include basic indices of recipients’ socio-economic conditions along with two 
independent measures of terrorism and an indicator of armed conflict. To ensure 
predeterminedness and sequential exogeneity, the regressors are lagged by one year. This 
operation should capture better the aid allocation process, where decisions are typically 
taken in advance during budget planning procedures.  
The results largely confirm the existence of “population bias” meaning that larger 
countries tend to get shares of aid smaller than suggested by their population size. Foreign 
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aid appears to be increasing in income, but at a decreasing rate. Thus, donors are likely to 
concentrate their assistance efforts on poor countries. However, bilateral donors 
discriminate LICs, probably due to the weaker economic ties connecting those countries 
with the world. The income-aid relationship is different among the oil exporting recipients. 
Namely, inter-governmental institutions tend to cut aid sharply when country’s GDP per 
capita increases, while bilateral donors are influenced mostly by the volume of oil exports. 
Finally, trade openness increases both multilateral and bilateral aid. 
Armed conflict has a strong negative impact on foreign aid receipts. Its occurrence 
cuts bilateral and multilateral assistance by 40 and 80 per cent, respectively. However, 
bilateral donors are indifferent to violence in oil exporting countries. The two types of 
donors respond differently to terrorism. The episodes of international terrorism are 
associated with increased bilateral aid. This is consistent with the principal-agent 
framework in which recipients can count on additional assistance in return for undertaking 
counterterrorism efforts. At the same time, bilateral donors are less sensitive to domestic 
terrorism measured by GTD; their reaction is manifested by a reduction of assistance to 
LICs. Multilateral donors do not respond to international terrorism, but strongly react to its 
domestic variant. Importantly, they seem to treat the poorest and richer recipients equally.  
Overall, the results seem to confirm that bilateral donors are likely to use assistance 
as a tool to achieve their strategic interests, while their multinational counterparts are more 
committed to poverty reduction and aid efficiency. For instance, to protect political and 
economic interests, bilateral donors may use aid to convince other states to participate in 
the fight against international terrorism, which may be considered as a substitute to 
defensive homeland efforts. Simultaneously, they are indifferent to domestic terrorism, 
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which does not affect them directly. They are also likely to favour countries with large oil 
exports and discriminate LICs, which are worse trading partners.  
In contrast, multilateral donors are not influenced by the size of oil exports. One can 
also imagine that they would find it very difficult to explain why they discriminate LICs, 
the countries in the greatest need for help. Unlike bilateral donors, they do not need to 
provide security for their citizens, and therefore they do not have additional incentives in 
assisting violence ridden states. Indeed, they may be conflict averse due to the potential 
losses in aid effectiveness. They exhibit the strongest aversion to armed conflict, which 
causes much greater depletion of human and physical capital than terrorism. It appears 
likely that multinational agencies try to reward peaceful countries in order to set an 
example to others and thus promote stability among developing nations. Presumably, their 
dedication to poverty reduction and development is stronger because they should not be 
influenced by strategic alliances and geopolitical factors. However, one cannot rule out that 
multinational institutions are still under some influence of governments that constitute 
them, which could help to explain their lack of reaction to international terrorism. After all 
the largest multilateral donors are dominated by the Western countries, which are also the 
most frequent targets of international terrorists.  
 124 
 
Table 3.1. Summary statistics of the terrorism and conflict data 
Sample Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Variance fractions* 
Individual Time Random 
        Attacks per million persons: ITERATE 
    All 
recipients 0.285 1.515 0 34.282 0.275 0.020 0.705 
LICs 0.097 0.410 0 6.720 0.363 0.024 0.614 
Oil Exp. 0.236 1.004 0 22.183 0.075 0.029 0.896 
        Attacks per million persons: GTD 
    All 
recipients 1.313 6.778 0 167.535 0.268 0.026 0.706 
LICs 0.474 1.710 0 29.751 0.348 0.054 0.598 
Oil Exp. 0.638 1.643 0 30.473 0.095 0.041 0.864 
        Conflict 
       All 
recipients 0.186 0.390 0 1 0.489 0.009 0.502 
LICs 0.327 0.469 0 1 0.408 0.032 0.559 
Oil Exp. 0.226 0.418 0 1 0.539 0.013 0.448 
* Fraction of the data's variance that can be attributed to individual, time and random effects. 
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Table 3.2. Correlations by subsample 
Variable 
Bilat. 
aid 
Multilat. 
aid 
Popul-
ation 
GDP 
Open-
ness 
Civil 
libert. 
ITER-
ATE 
GTD 
 
        
All recipients 
       Multilat. aid 0.143 
       Population -0.076 -0.103 
      GDP 0.013 -0.032 -0.086 
     Openness 0.115 0.130 -0.186 0.264 
    Civil libert. -0.176 -0.263 0.076 -0.142 -0.174 
   ITERATE 0.003 -0.015 -0.040 0.088 0.041 -0.044 
  GTD 0.047 -0.008 -0.033 0.004 -0.061 -0.012 0.339 
 Conflict -0.067 -0.173 0.163 -0.170 -0.244 0.242 0.064 0.210 
         LICs 
       Multilat. aid 0.479 
       Population -0.191 -0.177 
      GDP 0.131 0.157 0.102 
     Openness 0.308 0.310 -0.199 0.246 
    Civil libert. -0.188 -0.191 -0.098 -0.216 -0.187 
   ITERATE 0.036 -0.002 -0.063 -0.011 -0.014 0.124 
  GTD 0.119 0.089 -0.058 0.116 0.004 -0.016 0.349 
 Conflict -0.231 -0.253 0.185 -0.112 -0.263 0.191 0.169 0.180 
         Oil Exporters 
       Multilat. aid 0.125 
       Population -0.055 -0.078 
      GDP 0.027 -0.184 -0.317 
     Openness 0.063 0.074 -0.373 0.132 
    Civil libert. -0.029 -0.270 -0.055 -0.009 0.179 
   ITERATE 0.002 -0.027 -0.095 0.130 0.100 -0.015 
  GTD 0.179 0.081 -0.072 -0.013 0.070 0.020 0.673 
 Conflict -0.042 -0.113 0.392 -0.317 -0.061 0.198 -0.025 0.152 
Aid, GDP, ITERATE and GTD attacks are measured per capita. Civil libert. is a Freedom House index on 
a scale from one to seven, one indicating the highest degree of freedom, and seven the lowest. 
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Table 3.3. Bilateral aid: the effects of armed conflict and terrorism  
(two-way panel estimates, recipient-specific effects) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Terrorism dataset ITERATE ITERATE GTD GTD 
          
Ln(population) -0.519 -0.713* -0.572 -0.807** 
 
(0.368) (0.411) (0.370) (0.411) 
Ln(GDP per capita) 7.490*** 7.838*** 7.410*** 7.739*** 
 
(0.955) (1.026) (0.974) (1.034) 
Squared Ln(GDP per capita) -0.504*** -0.533*** -0.500*** -0.527*** 
 
(0.0608) (0.0650) (0.0619) (0.0655) 
Ln(openness) 0.261*** 0.174* 0.281*** 0.208** 
 
(0.0874) (0.0957) (0.0882) (0.0969) 
Ln(attacks per capita) 0.947** 1.350*** 0.362* 0.0969 
 
(0.402) (0.415) (0.189) (0.117) 
Squared Ln(attacks per capita) 0.0284** 0.0416*** 0.00981 0.00178 
 
(0.0129) (0.0133) (0.00622) (0.00338) 
Conflict -0.363*** -0.407*** -0.422*** -0.425*** 
 
(0.0865) (0.148) (0.0949) (0.157) 
LIC 
 
-0.275** 
 
-0.352*** 
  
(0.124) 
 
(0.132) 
LIC * attacks 
 
-0.00960 
 
-0.0175** 
  
(0.00929) 
 
(0.00826) 
LIC * conflict 
 
0.0716 
 
0.0689 
  
(0.152) 
 
(0.156) 
Civil liberties
a
 -0.0975*** -0.141*** -0.104*** -0.145*** 
 
(0.0303) (0.0360) (0.0310) (0.0368) 
Israel
b
 4.154*** 4.057*** 4.046*** 4.031*** 
 
(0.873) (0.926) (0.880) (0.933) 
Egypt
b
 2.106*** 2.311*** 2.186*** 2.509*** 
 
(0.605) (0.634) (0.602) (0.636) 
Pakistan
b
 1.266 1.549* 1.390* 1.785* 
 
(0.795) (0.857) (0.801) (0.866) 
     Observations
c
 4,761 4,005 4,603 3,871 
R-squared 0.616 0.611 0.618 0.613 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All explanatory variables lagged. 
a
 Scale from 1, free, to 7, not free. Negative coefficients mean that less free states receive less aid. 
b 
Coefficients on Israel, Egypt and Pakistan are the country-specific fixed effects estimates. 
c
 The difference in the number of observations between ITERATE and GTD is caused by the 
GTD’s missing records for year 1993. Otherwise, the samples would be of nearly identical size. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.4. Multilateral aid: the effects of conflict and terrorism 
(two-way panel estimates, recipient-specific effects) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Terrorism dataset ITERATE ITERATE GTD GTD 
          
Ln(population) -1.449*** -1.349*** -1.580*** -1.457*** 
 
(0.360) (0.425) (0.359) (0.426) 
Ln(GDP per capita) 10.67*** 11.31*** 10.74*** 11.32*** 
 
(1.135) (1.235) (1.128) (1.220) 
Squared Ln(GDP per capita) -0.702*** -0.753*** -0.707*** -0.755*** 
 
(0.0693) (0.0754) (0.0691) (0.0748) 
Ln(openness) 0.474*** 0.546*** 0.471*** 0.552*** 
 
(0.123) (0.139) (0.124) (0.139) 
Ln(attacks per capita) 0.317 0.400 -0.270* -0.247 
 
(0.559) (0.546) (0.141) (0.153) 
Squared Ln(attacks per 
capita) 0.00349 0.00602 -0.00950** -0.00903** 
 
(0.0177) (0.0173) (0.00409) (0.00445) 
Conflict -0.838*** -0.842*** -0.830*** -0.820*** 
 
(0.115) (0.177) (0.125) (0.193) 
LIC 
 
-0.120 
 
-0.138 
  
(0.223) 
 
(0.213) 
LIC * attacks 
 
0.000447 
 
-0.00237 
  
(0.0151) 
 
(0.0126) 
LIC * conflict 
 
0.00434 
 
-0.0322 
  
(0.211) 
 
(0.222) 
Civil liberties
a
 -0.0304 -0.0665 -0.0292 -0.0607 
 
(0.0370) (0.0435) (0.0379) (0.0446) 
Israel
b
 -1.807 -1.361 -1.648 -1.157 
 
(1.159) (1.208) (1.179) (1.223) 
Egypt
b
 4.558*** 4.414*** 4.497*** 4.360*** 
 
(0.917) (0.935) (0.924) (0.939) 
Pakistan
b
 6.177*** 6.044*** 5.961*** 5.816*** 
 
(1.024) (1.081) (1.030) (1.085) 
     Observations
c
 4,714 3,979 4,557 3,846 
R-squared 0.610 0.614 0.608 0.612 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All explanatory variables lagged. 
a
 Scale from 1, free, to 7, not free. Negative coefficients mean that less free states receive less aid. 
b 
Coefficients on Israel, Egypt and Pakistan are the country-specific fixed effects estimates. 
c
 The difference in the number of observations between ITERATE and GTD is caused by the 
GTD’s missing records for year 1993. Otherwise, the samples would be of nearly identical size. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.5. Oil exporters: the effects of armed conflict and terrorism  
(two-way panel estimates) 
  Bilateral aid Multilateral aid 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Terrorism dataset ITERATE GTD ITERATE GTD 
     Ln(population) -2.148** -2.270** -4.511*** -4.708*** 
 
-1.021 (1.049) -0.836 (0.875) 
Ln(GDP per capita) 3.343 2.963 -13.96*** -13.64*** 
 
-4.125 (4.227) -4.24 (4.339) 
Squared Ln(GDP per capita) -0.241 -0.230 0.639*** 0.612*** 
 
-0.22 (0.225) -0.224 (0.230) 
Ln(oil exports) 0.220*** 0.233*** 0.0612 0.0477 
 
-0.0744 (0.0831) -0.105 (0.108) 
Ln(openness) 0.0469 0.259 0.304 0.465 
 
-0.704 (0.735) -0.69 (0.703) 
Ln(attacks per capita) -0.0805 -0.0124 -0.0804* -0.0287 
 
-0.0494 (0.0464) -0.0482 (0.0489) 
Conflict -0.531 -0.580 -0.754** -0.758* 
 
-0.454 (0.479) -0.382 (0.413) 
Civil liberties
a
 0.158 0.132 0.171 0.243 
 
-0.152 (0.157) -0.154 (0.159) 
     Observationsb 500 487 500 488 
R-squared 0.58 0.580 0.689 0.687 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All explanatory variables lagged.  
a
 Scale from 1, free, to 7, not free. Negative coefficients mean that less free states receive less aid. 
b
 The difference in the number of observations between ITERATE and GTD is caused by the 
GTD’s missing records for year 1993. Otherwise, the samples would be of nearly identical size. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.6. Descriptive statistics for the recipient-specific fixed effects 
 Bilateral aid Multilateral aid 
 Table 3.3 Table 3.4 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ITERATE, 
no LIC 
dummy 
ITERATE, 
LIC 
dummy 
GTD, no 
LIC 
dummy 
GTD, LIC 
dummy 
ITERATE, 
no LIC 
dummy 
ITERATE, 
LIC 
dummy 
GTD, no 
LIC 
dummy 
GTD, LIC 
dummy 
         
Observations 160 133 160 134 158 133 158 133 
Minimum -6.095 -6.176 -6.075 -6.105 -8.493 -5.504 -8.160 -5.335 
Maximum 4.154 4.057 4.046 4.031 8.868 8.539 8.556 8.294 
Mean -0.096 -0.183 -0.084 -0.121 0.893 1.750 0.808 1.694 
Median 0.114 -0.034 0.078 -0.041 0.871 1.446 0.777 1.457 
St. Deviation 1.293 1.436 1.299 1.474 3.215 2.655 3.145 2.574 
St. Error of Mean 0.102 0.125 0.103 0.127 0.256 0.230 0.250 0.223 
Skewness -1.029 -0.948 -1.029 -0.819 -0.066 0.238 -0.052 0.253 
Kurtosis 6.711 5.661 6.632 5.195 3.002 3.078 2.970 3.069 
Descriptive statistics computed for the recipient-specific fixed effect coefficients obtained in estimation of the base model for bilateral 
and multilateral aid shown in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, respectively. The numbers of columns correspond to those in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. 
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Table 3.7. Baseline models from Table 3.3 and 3.4 re-estimated on the limited sample  
(only countries included in the WB income classification) 
 
Bilateral aid Multilateral aid 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Terrorism dataset ITERATE GTD ITERATE GTD 
     
Ln(population) -0.723* -0.767* -1.348*** -1.468*** 
 (0.409) (0.411) (0.423) (0.424) 
Ln(GDP per capita) 7.911*** 7.810*** 11.39*** 11.41*** 
 (1.011) (1.030) (1.213) (1.204) 
Squared Ln(GDP per capita) -0.536*** -0.531*** -0.756*** -0.759*** 
 (0.0646) (0.0657) (0.0746) (0.0742) 
Ln(openness) 0.168* 0.196** 0.543*** 0.550*** 
 (0.0960) (0.0969) (0.139) (0.139) 
Ln(attacks per capita) 1.346*** 0.398** 0.401 -0.242 
 (0.412) (0.191) (0.573) (0.148) 
Squared Ln(attacks per capita) 0.0416*** 0.0112* 0.00569 -0.00886** 
 (0.0132) (0.00628) (0.0182) (0.00429) 
Conflict -0.370*** -0.420*** -0.839*** -0.840*** 
 (0.0892) (0.0986) (0.117) (0.129) 
Civil liberties
a 
-0.140*** -0.146*** -0.0655 -0.0602 
 (0.0361) (0.0369) (0.0435) (0.0447) 
     
Observations
b
 4,005 3,871 3,979 3,846 
R-squared 0.611 0.613 0.614 0.612 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All explanatory variables lagged. 
a
 Scale from 1, free, to 7, not free. Negative coefficients mean that less free states receive less aid. 
b
 The difference in the number of observations between ITERATE and GTD is caused by the GTD’s 
missing records for year 1993. Otherwise, the samples would be of nearly identical size. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Columns (1) and (2) are the re-estimation of models (1) and (3) in Table 3.3. 
Columns (3) and (4) correspond to models (1) and (3) in Table 3.4. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis contributes to our understanding of some of the effects of terrorism and armed 
conflict. Each of the chapters helps us to understand behaviour of the respective agent types 
involved in violence. Chapter 1 focuses on decisions taken by terrorists when choosing an 
attack venue. It also lends some argument on the effectiveness of certain policies in 
deterring terrorism. Chapter 2 expands the evidence on attitudes of public opinion, or 
audience, towards the violence in the Iraq war. Finally, Chapter 3 adds to our knowledge of 
factors influencing foreign aid decisions made by governments and multinational 
institutions. 
 In particular, Chapter 1 exposes major discrepancies between two terrorist datasets, 
ITERATE and MIPT, and shows that, in spite of some substantial differences between 
them, they give fairly similar results. By showing that even seemingly insignificant 
adjustments in data may lead to very different conclusions, Chapter 1 offers a caveat 
against the dangers of using cross-national income data in time series analysis. This study 
acknowledges that all forms of terrorism in Iraq are likely to have wider audience abroad. It 
argues that citizens of countries with military presence in the Middle East may see their 
national interests being at stake, a view that finds support in the findings of Chapter 2. The 
results show that the effects of the rise of fundamentalist terrorism spread across all income 
groups, while the end of the Cold War was followed by transference of terrorism to the 
poorest countries. In contrast to the popular perception, the September 11 attacks did not 
cause a shift in the international terrorism patterns. Finally, the Iraq war coincided with a 
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reduction in the number of terrorist attacks in rich countries. This, when combined with a 
dramatic upsurge of terrorism in Iraq, provides some evidence for transference of terrorism 
from rich states to this Middle Eastern country.  
 Chapter 2 should be of interest to governments considering contribution of their 
troops to multinational military operations. It expands our knowledge of factors influencing 
war-related public opinion in coalition countries and indicates what is permissible and what 
is intolerable from a political point of view. Additionally, it confirms the validity of logged 
cumulative fatalities as an explanatory variable in war-time opinion models. The study 
shows that in the absence of frequent soldier fatalities, the public is likely to respond to 
perceived successfulness of a mission. There is evidence that the public in the coalition 
countries is sensitive to deaths in terrorist attacks in Iraq. This highlights the urgency of 
devising war strategies that tackle this form of violence in a more effective way. 
Furthermore, the public does not base their opinion only on the most recent events, but 
takes into account developments in earlier periods too. It reveals the costly nature of 
scandals of military misconduct and points out that news of success can significantly 
reduce war opposition.  
 The last chapter provides evidence on the effects of political violence on foreign 
aid. It shows that an occurrence of armed conflict cuts bilateral and multilateral assistance 
by 40 and 80 per cent, respectively. However, the two types of donors respond differently 
to terrorism. Episodes of international terrorism are associated with increased bilateral aid, 
while its domestic variant reduces multilateral assistance. The behaviour of bilateral donors 
is in line with the principal-agent model, in which recipients are reimbursed for undertaking 
counterterrorism efforts that are beneficial also for the donor. Further evidence that 
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governments use aid as a strategic tool comes from the fact that they are indifferent to 
domestic terrorism. They also tend to turn a blind eye on violence in oil exporting countries 
and focus their attention on the size of oil exports. In contrast, multilateral organizations 
strongly react to domestic terrorism and appear to be more committed to poverty reduction 
and aid efficiency. 
Providing security to citizens is becoming increasingly difficult as the world 
becomes more interconnected and borders seem to disappear. In result, terrorists can 
effortlessly communicate and travel across countries, as well as react strategically to 
security upgrades. At the same time, nations are likely to see their troops being deployed in 
remote regions in the name of national interests, which are becoming more difficult to 
define. These ongoing changes in the nature of conflict and terrorism call for continuous 
research into all aspects of political violence and its prevention. By exposing the shifts in 
location patterns of terrorism, this thesis underlines the need for collective and coordinated 
counterterrorism efforts on a global level. It emphasizes the need of coming up with 
policies and strategies ensuring as much safety as possible for people in countries to which 
we are sending our troops. Eventually, it stresses the importance of maintaining peace and 
stability in developing countries which are in need of foreign aid.  
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